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ABSTRACT
Planning begins with an attempt to bring upon its environment a particular
event or act, one which is socially desirable, but which would not have
occurred without such intervention. The rationality, or raison d'etre of
planning is therefore incumbent upon its ability to achieve defined envir-
onmental objectives, in an efficient and effective manner. The efficacy of
planning is, in turn, a matter of actualizing the conceptual linkages be-
tween the goal and the process by which it is achieved; its deliberateness
is thus characterized by the nature of the means to that end.
A persistent source of problems, when planning theory has reached the real
enviornment in the form of "a plan", is the inherently interactive nature
of the relationship between the planning system and the planned system (or,
object of the plan). Thus, while it is easier to treat the respective posi-
tions of the planners and theplanned as static, they are, in reality and by
definition, dynamic: the planning system acts upon the planned system, and
the latter reacts in turn. A critical, but often neglected, variable in
any planning process is therefore the unknown variable which represents
the planned system's latent reactions; the situations which resulted from
the city of Seoul's three programs of squatter settlement removal, in the
late sixties and early seventies, are a case in point.
Therefomethe dilemma which is posed to planners is to be able to take
account of this "human side of planning" in the design and implementation
of their projects. It follows that the thesis of this paper is that the
dialogic communication process between the planning system and the planned
system can be intelligently managed, so as to deliberately shape the future.
To do so, the rationality of planning must be reestablished, on the basis
of a better understanding of the "purposefulness " of human behaviors in
the planning process.
The first section of this paper addresses this problem through a critical
evaluation of the logic of the conventional paradigm of planning. This
is followed by a discussion of the factors leading to, and the results
accruing from, the Seoul city government's attempt (through three sub-
stantively different but simultaneous programs) to handle the problems
caused by squatter housing developments. The final section reviews the
implications of these results for planning theory, in general, and suggests
a number of alternative approaches which might have been taken by the city
of Seoul to deal -- with more successful results -- with the problem of
unathorized residential development.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Lisa R. Peattie
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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11. Introduction
Definition of Problem
There are many ways of explaining a meaning of "planning," through
various aspects, such as advocacy, corporate, contingency, comprehensive
planning and so on. In any case however, planning always begins with an
intent to bring about a particular event or act, in its environment. This
means that planning is a human behavior which is directed to the attainment
of desired ends, by the application of intelligent human efforts to the
selection and execution of means. The rationality of planning, or perhaps
the raison d'etre of planning, therefore lies in its aptitude for effective
and efficient achievement of defined objectives. Furthermore, these objec-
tives differ from the outcome which would have naturally occurred. As Aaron
Wildavsky points out, "you do not need a plan to get you where you are going
to be." 1  Planning presupposes changes in its environmental setting. Thus,
planning embodies both rationalization of a decision to bring changes, and
formulation of a conceptual construct of the linkages between what is to
be achieved, and how the changes will occur, in the process of achieving on
its setting. Efficacy of planning is, therefore, a matter of actualizing the
conceptual linkages between the goal and the process of changing the environ-
ment; it involves deliberate efforts to control the process of changes--in-
cluding its setting itself--in accordance with the conceptual construct of
the end-means linkage. The deliberateness in planning is thus to be charac-
terized by the nature of the means to the end.
In theory, the relationship between the end and the means is conceived
as a more dynamic one. The costs and/or consequences of a means, or a set
of means, in the process of approaching a specified end-result ;are to be
evaluated in relation to the degree of attainment of the end result; the
2expectation being that such evaluative information is constantly fed back to
2reformulate the end-means chain. In this feedback-reformulation process,
the deliberateness of an end is evaluated by measurement of the feasibility
of the means, in terms of the costs and consequences of their implementation.
In reality, however, the chain of the end and the means can easily be
broken in the process of implementing a designed course of action; sometimes,
the constrai-nts thereof can be fully understood in the implementation pro-
cess, and sometimes they cannot. In any case, the control phase is an impor-
tant factor in maintaining the relationship between the end and the means
in the planning processing--in terms of not only the planning system, but
also its object. In the planning system, measures of control may be the
redefinition of the end-means chain in the level of sub-optimization and in-
stitutional arrangements. On the other hand, as the object of planning, it
needs to change its behavior so as to adapt to the planned course. However,
any setting within which planning takes place has its own capability to be
able to accept a planning goal. If we control beyond the zone of goal
acceptance, the plan may not be meaningful in terms of implementation, like
a blue-print plan. In many experiences of planning that have dealt with
the cities in developing countries, more failures or abortions of planning
have-been reported than have successes. Here, our question is whether there
is an inherent limit to the role of planning in a social system; or, how
much we can control the process of change, without going beyond a zone of
goal acceptance, or social tolerance, of a planning setting.
A conventional planning process assumes that planning, as an object of
planning; is given. Therefore, the rPntrol is valid and relevant only when
planning is conceived fundamentally.as one-way channelling of information
and/or energy, i.e., from the planning system to the planned system. This
3approach is particularly clear in developing countries, where goal intention
is very strong. In this type of situation, they have tried to achieve an
end whatever the means involved, maybe ignoring dialogic communication
between the planning organization and the individual members of the society
as an object of planning. It is one of the reasons why many plans in deve-
loping countries have not worked, producing such unanticipated results
as social upheaval, side effects .nd negative effects upon the society.
But it is essentially the absence of societal consensus on what ought to
be done which has drawn the attention to the "human side of planning." In
a time of such environmental turbulence, it is a fair warning that planning
should not impose a will of its own upon others, but rather to be a process
that mediates individual and social evolution.3
Therefore, it is the position of this study that the dialogic communica-
tion process can also be intelligently managed, so as to deliberately shape
the future. The "humanistic" element in this approach is to be found in the
definition of the efficacy of planning, in which the human nature of "pur-
posefulness" is taken into account. Thus, it is the point of departure of
ths study from the "humanist intimation"4 of planning approach that the
rationality of the efficacy of planning as an intelligent effort to shape
future changes in the environment can be reestablished, on the basis of a
more critical understanding of the "purposefulness" of human behaviors in
the planning process.
Objective and Method of Study
The primary objective of this study is to perform an empirical means
by which the relationship betweenthe end and the means is broken, based on
the process of interaction between the planning system and the planned sys-
tem. That is to say, this study is an attempt to see the responses of the
planned system, as the planning system takes action. Its analytical
4framework is formulated in terms of the interactive relationship between two
goal-seeking systems, in a social system's planning process--the two goal-
seeking systems being in this case, the planning system, and the planned
system as an object of planning. The planning system is defined as a group
of individuals who are institutionally organized to plan and control for
production of a specified outcome in its environment. This system is intern-
ally identical in its institutionally controlled organizational components,
their individual purposes being to serve the purpose of the system as a whole.
In this case study, the "planning system" is the Seoul city government.
The planned system is an object of planning. It consists of all the
variables of the environment that a particular planning system perceives
as being both controllable, and necessary to control, in its process of
achieving a particular planned outcome. In other words, it is the set of
variables in the environment--the "object" of planning--upon which the deli-
berate control measures and actions of the planning system are applied, to
produce the planned outcome. In this case study, the "planned system" con-
sists of urban squatter dwellers, as the object of a program of urban squat-
ter dwelling removal.
In order to see the responses of the planned system as the planning
system takes .actions, a situation in which it is required that the planning
system tale different approaches to the same problem. This will enable us to
observe how the planned system has responded to each program. I take a case
which had dealt with three separate programs aimed at solving the problems
caused by urban squatter dwellings in Seoul, Korea between 1967 and 1972.
In the 1960's Seoul city government conducted three separate and simul-
taneous programs to solve the urban squatter problems; legalization, "citizen's
apartments," and relocation. The legalization program legalized the squatter
5dwelling on the spot, as they had been. The citizen's apartment program
acted to provide multi-storied condumium-apartments on the land where the
squatters had previously been located. And the relocation program relocated
squatters outside the built-up urban area. Although the first phase of
legalization process (that is basically to upgrade squatter community
sites) and service program has continued to proceed, with the government's
substantial technical and financial assistance, the program was officially
terminated within a year of implementation. The explanation offered by the
city's decision-makers for the short life of the legalization program was
that it could not effectively deal with the new squatter dwellings invasion,
in the area in expectation of "legalization."
The citizen's apartment program was more successful than the legalization
program, in terms of its duration. In 1969 alone, the Seoul city government
constructed 403 walk-up buildings, providing 15,800 dwelling units at a total
cost of some 5.1 billion won (U.S. $17 million, or $1,077 per dwelling unit).
In spite of the neat appearance of the Seoul citizen's apartments however,
the basic quality of the building construction and foundation work was
unstable. Many of the apartment buildings developed cracks. As a result,
on April 8, 1970, one of the citizen's apartment buildings collapsed down
the hillside, killing thirty-three and injuring close to forty persons.
The mayor was held responsible and the citizen's apartment program was immed-
iately discontinued.
The relocation program acted to create a new town, for the relocation
of families from the inner-city slum and squatter households, in a rural
area about 28 km. southeast of Seoul. The scheme took the form of the
Kwangju New Town development, which was developed by Seoul city government.
Major aspects of the city's physical form, including industrial lots
6development, relocation and settlement control, as well as some portion of
social welfare measures, were all planned by the city. However, this
program failed to solve the basic needs of the transplanted squatter dwellers,
and eventually led to a mass social riot against the city government's
policies of relocation and settlement control. During the riot four govern-
ment automobiles and the local police substation were burned, and the
Kwangju Field Office of Seoul city government was completely destroyed.
Therefore, the government decided to stop transporting squatters to the
Kwangju New Town.
Da.ta and information with respect to these cases were collected from
three sources. The first source was government documents, such as statistical
books, plans, and reports of research institutes. For primary data, an in-
terview method was used. Subjects included city government officials, re-
presentatives of squatter dwellers, and professional planners. Among city
government officials, an interview with the former Mayor of Seoul city,
Hyeh Ok Kim who was an initiator of the three programs, is also included.
The final source of information was provided by the squatters themselves.
Organization
The study will be composed of three main parts. The first part is a
critical evaluation of the logic of the conventional paradigm of planning.
The purpose of this section is to expose the theoretical relationship be-
tween the concept of efficacy of planning and the social systems to which
planning is directed. The theoretical. relevance of this section to the
final objective of the study is, of course, in establishing the point at
which the efficacy of planning (as conceived in -the conventional paradigm)
is based on the invalid and/or indiscriminate conception of the planned
system, and therefore,. that the failures of many instances of social systems
planning is logically inherent in the paradigm.
7The second part describes the socio-economic and physical characteris-
tics of squatter dwellings in Seoul city, and the process of squatter dwel-
ling formation. This is preceded by a description of general characteristics
of the political e.conomy and urbanization in Seoul , which have been related
to the generation of squatter dwellings in Korea.
The third part of the thesis attempts to test the interactive relation-
ship between the planning system and the planned system, through the three
aforementioned programs. In this section, the details of each programlare
explained. Subsequently, the deviations of the relationship between two
systems are analytically described, and final conclusions drawn with respect
to the planned, and planning, systems.
8PART ONE - NOTES
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92. Planning Process in Social System
A Concept of Planning
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, planning begins with an in-
tent to bring about a particular event or act in its environment. The ini-
tent contains the element of "preference" or "valuation" vis-a-vis the event
or act to occur, or not to occur, in the environment. Thus, the end of plan-
ning is desired, or preferred, to be attained. The end may be merely an
acceptance of the result of the ongoing trend, or a proposition that is
attainable by changing the ongoing process: in either case if it is planned,
the end is desired or preferred to the exclusion of other possibilities.
In order to exclude other possibilities, a degree of deliberateness in
selecting the means to achieve the end must be introduced. Planning is nei-
ther merely a preference-ordering nor a declaration of intent: i'ntelligence
is applied to relate a means, or a set of means, to the end to be attained.
The deliberateness in planning is, therefore, to be characterized by the
nature of intelligence as applied to the relation of the means to the end.
As the element of intelligence is introduced in the end-means chain, a
time lag between the application of intelligence and the occurence of the
end must be admitted. Thus, we can conceptualize a plan, or design, as a
"precursor to action",1 being a component of a more inclusive -concept of
planning. A "plan" is, therefore, a conceptual construct of the end-means
relationship, which is eventually to be translated into an actual process
of implementation.
However, as it has become known that the chain of the end and the means
can easily be broken in the process of implementing a designed course of
action. Sometimes, the constraints of such can be more fully understood
in the implementation process; as a result, it is now generaly acknowledged
10
that the design of the ends-means chain need not be a once and for all affair,
but a continuous effort throughout the entire goal-seeking process. Thus, we
find planning defined as an iterative process of goal-seeking. Thanks to
the introduction of cybernetics, the concept of iterative process does not
merely mean a "trial-and-error " process, but a more sophisticated manage-
ment of the process of feedback-and-control.2
As the conceptual dichotomy between the conceptual construct of the
end-means relationship and the actual implementation thereof has become
less and less meaningful, the conceived relationship between the end and the
means has assumed more dynamic quality. The costs and/or consequences of a
means, or a set of means, in the process of approaching a specified end-re-
sult are to be evaluated in relation to the degree of attainment of the
end result; and such evaluative information are expected to be constantly
3fed back to reform the end-means chain. In this feedback-reformation pro-
cess, the desirability of an end is evaluated by the measurement of feasi-
bility of the means, in terms of the costs and consequences of implementa-
tion of the means. Thus, the end-means relationship is not always a hier-
archical structure in which the means is selected only to serve the end as
given: rather, the two are interdependent, in order to be confirmed of
4
their rationality.
To summarize then, "planning" is understood as a dynamic process of
rational goal-seeking behavior, the dynamism of the process being represented
by the iterative feedback relationship between designing and controlling
the design-implementation, and at the same time, between the end and the
means.
11
Paradigm of Conventional Planning
Thus, in the modern paradigm of planning, the notion of the process of
planning is important; and the concept of control (i.e., in a more simplis-
tic sense, implementation) is an integral part of the concept of planning.
Therefore, it is -appropriate to review the means of control, in order to
fully understand the concept of planning.
Achieving an end by selecting and controlling the most effective and
efficient means, is to mean that a planning system is to have complete con-
trol of the outcome to occur. This control is designed in the conceptual
relationship between the end and the means. That is, the means is the
"producer" of the outcome, or "product", that was conceived to be desirable;
control functions to steer the conceived producer-product relationship
through the changing environments through time.
When the changing environment is not controllable, the option is either
to vary, coping with a variable environment, an object (i.e. the end-means
relationship as originally designed) to the extent possible not by redefining
the end, or to redefine the end as well as the means. However, as it must
be assumed in the pure logic of planning that the controllability, or the
degree and probability thereof, of the variable environment is already
accounted for in the designed erd-means relationship, the options in the
steering process cannot in principle include that of abandoning the end it-
self.
At any rate, the concept of "steering" is thus defined in terms of the
constancy between the variable environment and the production functions of
the end-means chain is the operational link between the end-means. Hence,
tjhe point to be noted for our purpose with respect to the concept of
steering in the conventional paradigm of planning, is that. the conventional
concept of planning is based fundamentally on the "engineering " feasibility
12
of a particular chain of the end-means, in reference to the environment--
including the planned system. That is to say, the planned system is to be
"engineered " or "steered" through the particular constraints of the
environment.
It is therefore essential, first of all, to understand what is given
of the environmental constraints (including the aspects, or the system,
to which the planning is to be applied) and secondly, to engineer the plan-
ned system, in the most economic way, to bring about the desired end.
The "given" can be virtually anything from the historical trends of popula-
tio size of a city to the market behaviors of the natives of an island in
the Pacific--depending on the recognition of the relevant aspects, or sys-
tems of phenomena, for a particular planning process. Understanding the
givens is to identify the parameters, boundary conditions, or constraints
that determine the range of possible solutions: and it is expected that
the solution selected within the range will induce, or engineer, the planned
system to perform, or to produce, as conceived in the plan. The engineering
objective is of course, to eliminate, or reduce the difference between the
existing conditions and/or performance of the planned system, and the system
objectives as proposed by planning: in the system's parlance, it is to
optimize the real world system by seeking optimization of the conceptual
system.
Whatever the theoretical grounds of validity, and whatever the measure
of reliability may be, if it is to know about the feasibility of engineering,
the object of planning, and the environmental constraints so as to achieve
the outcome as exogeneously contemplated, the image of the planned system
must be said to be "machine-like". That is, the intended outcome is to be
achieved by manipulating the mechanism of change and/or performance of the
13
object of planning within the given constraints.
An objection may be raised against the above generalization in referen-
ce to the directness-indirectness of the control process vis-a-vis the plan-
ned object. In other words, a new mode of behavior proposed by the planning
system is not' directly imposed upon the object; rather, it has the object
learn it. This is the kind of approach often observed in organizational
development and expounded, in termw.e adoption and rejection, by the planned
organizations of innovations as di~fiused by the change agents.5 As the con-
cept of adoption by the planned system of a particular innovative mode of
behavior is conceived to include the receiver collaboration in terms of moti-
vation and involvement,6 the image of the planned object is not supposed to
be machine-like. Hence, the concept of steering may not be quite appropriate
vis-a-vis such an object.
Nevertheless, it is certain that the object's motivation is to be gene-
rated by the planning; and furthermore, the generation of the motivation is
to be specifically directed to the particular behavioral mode, as designed
by the planning system. The dichotomous notions of adoption and rejection,
not contemplated any other forms of permutation, can only be explained in
relation to the engineered motivation specifically geared to a planned out-
come. Thus, the only difference, if any, between the more common approaches
of direct engineering and this approach is that, if the former is to engi-
neer adaptation of the planned objert to new modes of behavior, the latter
is to engineer the motivation of the object to adopt the behavioral modes.
This objective section was to explain the engineering approach
embedded in the conventional concept of planning. Given. that planning is
perceived as the producer of the intended outcome in the reality, the notion
of steering the planned system, in terms of maintaining a constant relation-
14
ship between the system and the environment, is an indispensable element in
the conventional paradigm of planning. To maintain the constant relation-
ship between the planning system and its environment, it is necessary either
to force the planning system, or to control the environment, when the envir-
onment is changing; and such a control process is here called "engineering".
As the control is deliberately applied to the planned object--either
to adapt to, or to adopt the new behavioral mode as stipulated in the
template of the planning system--the planned object is perceived in the image
of a reactive machine system. The point here is that the planned object
should be treated as the co-producer of the planned outcome, not merely to
be engineered toward the outcome as intended by the planning system. This
notion is particular important with respect to the cases described herein,
in which the planned object is the urban renewal plan.
It can therefore be concluded that such a concept of control is valid
and relevant only when planning is conceived fundamentally as one-way chan-
nelling of information and/or energy (i.e., from the planning system to the
planned system). Indeed, because of such a conception of planning, the
8ideology and/or ethic of planning arises as a controversial issue.
Therefore, when the co-production process is recognized, the concept of con-
trol 'cannot be defined to be merely manipulated, by the planning system,
upon the object to achieve an intended outcome. Instead, it must be defined
as intended by the planning system.
Paradigm of Social System Planning
The previous section pointed out that conventional planning, having
made no references to the differential properties and/or the nature of the
objects of planning, does not contain the discriminate measures of efficacy
in relation to different objects. As a result, conventional planning efforts
15
have focused on the planning system itself, assuming that the object of
planning--i.e., the "purposefulness", the paradigm of social systems plan-
ning, must be reorganized by the concept of co-production.
Here, the meaning of "purposefulness" denotes an act or behavior that
may be interpreted as being directed to the attainment of a goal, i.e., to
a final condition in which the behaving object reaches a definite correlation
in time, or in space, with respect to another object or event.9 Hence:, the
goal-directedness is conceivable fundamentally in its relationship with the
external world; in fact, the external world provides the reference signal
from which the error signals are fed into the system, so that the object re-
acts to them to maintain the desired correlation with the external world.
Therefore, it needs to understand the process of how a purposeful system
changes its modes of behavior in relation to changes in environmental
conditions.
The directive aspect of living organisms in their goal-seeking behaviors
vis-a-vis the environment is, of course, directed by the needs of survival
and maintanence as active, self-regulating, reproducing selves. Thus, any
stimulus from the environment may elicit an immediate response in terms
of what Sommerhoff calls the "back reference period" 10
The reaction pattern of a human social system is,howeverdifferent
from that of the individual member, That is, each response to the environmen-
tal stimulus is mediated, so to speak, by the complex organization of the
behavior-system for self-preservation and self-regulation. In other words,
a human social system is the choice-response to a specific stimulus from
the environment to the responding system: we call it an interactive choice.
From the point of view of the purposefully responding system, the envir-
onment (as changed by a particular stimulus) is a possible choice-situation
16
which can be be transformed into probablities of choice, efficiencies, and
relative values in order for the responding system to seek its own goal.
The so-called environmental response function is to be equated with this
transformation function of individual human beings and/or social systems
and their modes of variance in interaction with particular stimuli. That
is to say, that each is an individual transformation function; and this indivi-
duated transformation function cermines the particular mode of behavior
in response to an environmental stimulus, Regardless of whether an enviro-
nmental stimulus is directed to a particular individual the stimulus may
create a possible choice situation for that individual to seize
upon to seek its own goal, as far as it happens within the bound of the
12
so-called "life-space" of the individual in question.
As Herbert Simon definesit, "life-space" includes "only those aspects
of the totality(of environment) that have relevance for the "needs",
13
"drives", or "goals" of the organism.
Thus, any external stimulus that is beyond the bounds of this "life-
space" of an individual would not excite a response on the part of that
individual. This in turn means that the "life-space" is the boundary of
the environmental response function. In short, the individual 's environ-
mental response -function operates within this "life-space". This is the
field within which the systems output is "effective" and, at the same time,
the environmental stimulus into the system is affective. 14
However, as this "life-space" of the total environment is defined
by the "needs", "drives", or "goals" of the individual, the environmental
stimulus can not be defined as indepent of the object on which it acts.
Therefore, what is relevant .to an organism and its behavior is not simply
some external event, or solely some internal state but rather the transaction
17
whereby certain aspects of the external stimulus are sampled by the organism
and matched against selected internal states.
To summarize, an environmental stimulus within the so-called "life-
space is a potential choice situation which an organism may transformation
into an actual choice of behavior in order to seek its own goal. How an
environmental stimulus becomes an actual choice situation for an organism
is to be determined by the individuated transformation function. Once a
particular environmental stimulus affects the organism with respect to its
needs and survival, the organism transforms the stimulus into effective
behavior. The individuated transformation function therefore explains the
process of transformation of the affective environmental stimulus into ef-
fective behavior choice. However, the affectivity of an environmental sti-
mulus is riot determined solely by the objective property (eg. intensity)
of the stimulus alone, but by being perceived and/or felt as relevant, or
meaningful , by the subject on whom the stimulus acts.
In attempting to relate the above description of environmental response
and transformation functions to the concept of "co-production", we are con-
ceptualizing an interaction process between two or more co-producers in
which the outcome of goal-seeking behavior of each is transformed by its
contact with the other. Thus, the final outcome of such an interaction
process is co-produced in the contact-space.
At the same time, we must keep in mind the fact that in strategic
interactions the concepts of control and acommunication are very important.
Here, in order to produce an outcome based on'the interactive process
between two systems, it must be assumed that the planned system will inter-
act with the controlling behavior of the planning system as much as it does
with the intellectual behavior of planning. However, in a situation which
the central power of coercive force is used to overcome resistance,the
18
the co-production function is expected to be eliminated. Amitai Etzioni
15
explains this situation with the concept of "over-managed". This
concept refers to the situation in which the desired outcome is achieved,
but in an inefficient manner; and it may be achieved effectively and effi-
ciently, but the beneficiaries do not care what it is.
One system can affect the other system of the output-producing behavior
by physically changing the environment, i.e., by producing a specific
behavior-output, but also by communicating its intention toward the future. 6
The receipt of communication from the other interaction system affects the
receiver's perception of the sender's intent toward future behavior. This,
in turn effects changes in the receiver's beliefs of, and attitudes toward,
available courses of action, relative efficiencies of the available action
17
courses, and the values of the possible outcomes. Without this communica-
tion, each system goes on its own way.
Finally, while'we have discussed the concept of co-production in terms
of interaction of two or more individual transformation functions, the dy-
namic process of change, over time, of the interactions between the stimu-
lus and response has not been dealt with. Conceptualizing the changing
patterns of response in living organisms to external stimuli over time is
possible in terms of 'learning'. The concept of learning incorporates the
time-element in terms of purposeful selective function on the part of living
organisms on the basis of accumulated experiences of the past-present stim-
uli-response relationships. In short, learning is the process of changes
18in the responses with experiences to the external stimuli.
In experimental psychology, the traditional concept of learning refers
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to the biological capacity of forming associations between a stimulus and
responses. 9 That is to say, learning is to be conceived in terms of
identical responses to recurrent stimuli. This pure associationist concep-
tion fails, however, to explain the latent learning phenomenon. 20In
the human learning process, human beings build up an anticipatory posture
over time, vis-a-vis the particular configuration of the environment. 21
Over time, then, mutually adaptive. systems will be able to rely more and
more for respective goal-seeking on each other's anticipated responses.
Hence the interactive process may be conceived of as mutual anticipating-
causing field 22 for goal-seeking. Thus, the interactive process can be con-
ceived of as an anticipating-causing field; for individual interacting
systems, internal programs of choice can be designed on the basis of such
mutual anticipations. Returning to the concept of co-production of outcome
between a planning and a planned system in a social systems planning pro-
cess, an outcome is therefore coproduced, and conceived to be shared, to the
extent that there is a mutual anticipation of each other's goal-seeking
behavior sequences.
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3. Planning Environment
Political -Economic Environment of Korea
In 1961, Korea had a military coup led by Major General Park Chung-
Hee. The military posed as the caretaker of a sick nation plagued with
social disruption, economic stagnation, political instability, and Commu-
nist subversion, with the promise. of returning to iits own duties of
national defense upon the achievement of such caretaking.
After the Park regime took over power, the first action was a revolution
of bureaucracy in terms of administrative culture and personnel administra-
tion. In 1963, for instance, 40 out of 95 holders of top government posts
were occupied by men with professional military backgrounds. In the same
year, 36 out of 174 seats in the national assembly were held by retired
military figures. Retired military officers were also given 32 of 59 amba-
ssadorial posts. First of all, these people introduced military culture
to bureaucracywith its "target-hitting"mentality. Thus, in every government
agencies a planning office was established, which was to formulate a tarjet.
Meanwhile., the Park regime put forward the economic well-being of the
nation as the overriding common good. In the name of the nation, it tried
to produce economic dynamic by state initiative. The dominant position of
the state in the accumulation process was expressed by the concept of
guided capitalism: as formally stated in Five-Year Economic Development
plan. Given the Park regime's strong commitment to the achievement of eco-
nomic development, the bureaucracy provided all possible administrative
measures t.o implement plans. With the President at the helm, the
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administration dominated the economic development policies of the legislative
and judiciary branches. Under this bureaucratic arrangement, economic
policies were given top priority and the well-trained technocratic and
bureaucratic elites in the state apparatus carried out policies with strong
administrative power.
Through the Park regime's strong commitment to the achievement of econo-
mic development, and the uninterrupted efforts of technocratic and bureau-
cratic elites, Korea broke the eternal vicious circle of poverty and under-
development. In the period of the first five-year economic development plan
(1962-1966) 2, the annual growth rate of the GNP grew to 7.7%. In absolute
terms, the GNP of Korea grew 1.4 times, amounting to 3.789 billion won (at
1975 prices); growth in the national income per capita was 1.44 times, amoun-
tina to 126 dollars. As time went on, the annual growth rate grew even
higher. In the period of the second five-year economic development plan
(1967-1971), the annual growth rate was 10.5%, and the GNP had grown up to
be 1.64 times, amounting to 6.230 billion. Comparing to that of 1962, it
had grown up to 2.3 times. And the increase in national income per capita
was 2.1 times, amounting to 266 dollars, which was 3.05 times larger than
that of 1962. Accordingly, Korean economy has made the first step toward
the "take-off".
Urbanization
As a result of its remarkable economic development, Korea was undergoing
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TABLE i: POLATION DISTRInTI'A BY SE'LDCM(T SIZE .RXUP REL.ELIC OF KDREA: 1960, 1971
1960 1971
no. of population no. of population
settlere-t "rie group settlements in thousands % settle,-ents in thousanda %
OVER I,000,000 PO'LATI
BETWEEN 250,000 AND'
1,000,000 POPUIATION
BETWEEN 100,000 AND
250,000 PORJLATION
ALL SETTEMNTS OVER
100,000 PONIATIR
REMAINDER REPUBLIC OF
KOREA
TOTAL REPUBLIC OF KOREA
2 3,608 14% 3
3 1.391 61 6
14 701 13% U
9 5,703 23% 18
- 19,286 77% -
- 24,989 100% 32,418 100%
Source: 1960 census; 1971 and as: Econanic Planning Board.
TABLE 2: INCREASE OF POPUIATION BY SETTLEMENT SIZE GROUP REPUBLIC OF KOREA: ACTUAL 1960-1971
change 1960-1971
number
settlement size group in thousands
OVER 1,000,000 POPULATICM +4,369 +121%
ETWEN 250,000 AND 1,000,000
POPULATION + 6t16 + 30%
TWEEN 100,000 AND 250,000 POHIATIOF + Big +116%
ALL SETTLEMENTS OVER 100,000 POPUAITION .+5,64 + 99%
REAMAIDER OF REPUBLIC OF KOREA +1,825 +9%
TOTAL OF REPUBLIC OF KOREA +7,429 +29%
Source: 1960: Census; 1971 wnd Economie Planning Board
7,977 24%
1,807 6%
1,523 5%
11,307 35%
21,111 65%
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TABIZ 3: "URBAN" AND "PURAiL" POir.ATC: REMBLIC 0? KOIrEA: ACWAL 1955-1970:
ESTD(ATD C THE BASIS OF THE COC&2EM&ANT OF SEOUL:
Note: "Urban"- "shis" plus "eups" - settlements over 20,000 population
rural = "xiyuns" - settlements under 20,000 population
Category 1@5 1960 1966 170
URBAN
Seoul Metropolitan Area 2,342 3,424 4,862 6,826.
Pusan Metropolitan Area 1,596 1,760 2,033 2,587
Taegu Metroplitan Area 701 816 1,090 1,350
Kangju Metroplitan Area 389 451 583 683
Taejon MetrQplitan Area 408 485 553 672
CPonju Metrog tan Area 477 528 604 662
All other settlements over 20,000 1,93 2,303 2,661 2,956
TOrAL URBAN 7,847 9,767 12,386 15,736
RURAL 13,655 15,222 16,632 15,725
TOta Republic of Norea. 21,502 24,989 29,018 31,461
GROWTHl OF SiX METROPOUTAN AREAS
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
METROPOLITAd
AR EAS
SEOUL
PUSAN
TAEGU
KWANGJU
TAEJON
CHONJU
% 1770 1776 \981
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\7'55 19%C
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the most profound change in its eventful history -transformation from a
rural people, dispersed throughout the countryside, to an industrialized
urban society, concentrated in a few qreat cities.
A reyiew of statistics on the population of Korea's major cities,
compiled by the Economic Planning Board, provides evidence of the great
changes that were taking place. As shown on Table 1, in 1960, 77% of 'the
population of the country lived in rural areas and in small cities over
1000, 000 in size. By 1971, the rural areas and smaller settlements had
declined and contained only 65% of the population. The big cities accounted
for 35% of the total, and there are eighteen cities over 100,000.
Among the large cities the very largest had been growing the fastest.
In 1960 the two cities in the over-a-million size group-- Seoul and Pusan--
had 3.6 million people--14% of the national total. By 1971 Daegu had also.
grown to over a million; the three largest cities accounted for 8.0 million
people--24% of the national total. The fact that the biggest cities grow
the fastest is demonstrated on Table 2. Between 1960 and 1971 the population
of cities over a million increased 121%, compared to 99% for all large
cities, and 29% for Korea as a whole.
Table 3 shows dramatically how Seoul had come to over-
shadow all other cities. The growing over-concentration of population in
Seoul and vicinity is shown in another way on illustration 1, which comp-
ares population growth for six metropolitan areas which are made up of the
central cities and neighboring eups. The Seoul Metropolitan Area increased
from 2.3 million .in 1955 to 6.8 million in 1970. The Capital Region not
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only was larger than any other metropolitan area at the end of the Korean
War, but it had grown more rapidly ever since.
The growth of Seoul and other major cities has of course been at the
expense of rural areas, which have sent millions of immigrants to the big
cities. Rural numbers increased from 13.7 million in 1955 to 16.7 milllion
in 1966. Since 1966, however, rural areas have lost a million people.
The principal determinants of the pace and patterns of such rapid ur-
banization were those which were found in other developing countries: the
tremendous growth of industry in relation to agriculture and the wide ais-
parities in the quality of economic infrastructure, and cultural amenities
resulting in concentration of industry in a few major cities (Seoul and
Pusan). Another factor that has been particularly important in Korea has
been the rather extreme concentration of quality higher education in Seoul
which, with the relatively high social importance of education and the high
degree of mobility in Korea, is regarded as one of- the major causes of con-
centration in Seoul. 5 This has added to the normal attraction of the capi-
tal city as the seat of political and economic power.
Such a rapid urbanization of Seoul had exceeded its socio-economic
capacities and facilities, resulting in serious problems of social and
economic absorption for the city and further accentuating the dualistic
texture of the nation's economic development patterns.
Dualism in the urban economy exists most markedly in the context of
industrial and commercial life. Modern, large scale capital intensive
firms using advanced technology coexist with traditional, fragmented small
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scale, labor-intensive economic activities such as cottage industries.
This dualitic structure of urban economic activities is paralled by a
dichtomy of income patterns. White collar workers in the modern sector
have experienced substantial increases in real income while unskilled and
semi-skilled workers in traditional labor intensive industries , such as
construction laborers, have not increased their real income at a comparable
rate. Because of the flood of rural migrants the competition for such
jobs is so intense that wages remain permanently depressed. It had been
estimated that the work force realized little, if any, improvement in their
living standard in recent years: wage increases in this sector have, until
recently, barely kept up with inflation.
In such a situation, urban housing had become scarce in quantity, expen-
sive in price, and overcrowded to the extent that doubling-up and tripling-
up were commonplace. Coincident with these problems was that of the urban
squatter settlements. The low income migrants were blamed for creating
communities of "sub-standard" housing; shacks and makeshift shelters which
violate public building codes and regulations. Squatters had built their
houses covertly on public land on overly crowded sites where they do not
usually pay for land or house. The situation was worsened when the squa-
tters who accumulate significant savings began to move out, and lease their
houses for profit to the newly arriving migrants. These illeqal housinq
activities further contributed to the influx of rural migrants to the urban
centers, causing even greater housing needs for the urban population.
According to the report "Investigation of Illegal Housing in Seoul
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City" which was conducted by the city government in 1966, the squatter
dwellings had been built at an annual average of 9,648 units from 1962 to
1966. The annual construction growth rate was 3.6%. Since 1966, the in-
creasing pace was faster than that of the preceding period. According to
the report, "Re-Investigation of Illegal Housing in Seoul City," 88,990 new
units were built in the period from 1967 to 1970, in spite of some measures
to remove squatter dwellings. Despite prohibitive policies, then, the growth
rate increased almost two-fold, by the end of the sixties.
Characteristics of Squatter Dwellings in Seoul
The definition of "squatter dwelling" differs from one country to
another, depending upon the degree of squatter settlement concentration and
the definition of housing quality and/or standards.
The most difficult task in the process of defining substandard housing
is to clarify the difference between a substandard unit and an illegal unit.
Normally the degree of substandardness is measured interms of qualita-
tive housing standards, whereas illegal housing is defined simply by the
absence of a legal title to the property. Genally, the major criterion for
determing substandard housing is insuffiency of habitability. A.L. Mabog-
unje points out6 that the first step in measuring habitability is consider
the various types of functions that standards are meant to perform in she-
iter provision. In reviewing the standards for shelter provision, espec-
ially in developing countries, he offered a threefold division as follows 7
1) Space-use and Density Standards
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2) Health and Sanitation Standards
3) Community Facilities and Services Standards.
According to him, the first category includes minimum lot sizes,
number of buildings per unit area, building bulk per unit, number of persons
per room or number of persons per area. The second grouping, technological
or performance standards, is intended to define the quality of environment,
particularly in terms of the quality of construction, the type of materials
that must be used, the quality of services that can be offered, or tolerable
levels of toxicity. The third grouping defined the lower and upper limits
of the size of population, and the area or distance to be served by parti-
cular amenities or community facilities.
However, in Korea the measuring criteria for substandard housing are
primarily both physical and legal. The Ministry of Sonstruction(MOC)
utilizes criteria which are a combination of qualitative and legal
characteristics, as follows: 8
1) Floor area is less than 7 pyeon9 9(substandard)
2) Ilegal housing on public land (illegal)
3) Housing without permission (illegal)
4) Housing witn inadequate building materials such as
Shacks (illegal or standard)
5) Lacking utilities such as electricity, water, and sewer
etc. (substandard)
The criteria used by- the city of Seoul are similar to those of the
MOC. The acquisition of proper title and building permission are two major
legal criteria. According to these criteria,"substandardness' embraces all
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illegally built housing. Therefore, the term of squatter dwelling refers
to both these categories of housing; i.e., legally and properly titled but
substandard housing,and illegally built, improperly titled housing.
The physical condition of squatter dwelling is single-story dwelli/ngs.
Most have one or.two rooms plus a cooking lean-to-built against an exterior
wall. The quality of construction varies greatly. Many are rudimentary
shacks of scrap materials. Many others are two- to three-room, solidly
constructed cement-block buildings with roofing of asbestos tile or even
of the red clay tile used on most of Seoul's smaller legal buildings.
Most larger and more visible settlements are of two types: flat land/
stream areas and mountain areas. The flatland/stream areas generally house
dilapidated single or double lines of shanties,alithough they may include
a few well-built houses. The mountain areas vary; New areas, often located
at the tops of moutains, look raw and poor. Older settlements are predo-
minantly small cement-block houses, often with red tile roofs and sometimes
gaily painted. Households with a bit more space and money prefer to enclose
thei.r houses and tiny patios with high walls.
Virtually all settleinents have communal water taps and electric lines.
although almost none have indoor plumbing. In weli-aevelopeo areas,
each house has its own latrine; in many settlements,
several households or a small segment of the settlement share a latrine.
Some of the older, larger, and better developed areas have paved main roads
and bus service. In most, however, roads are unpaved and too narrow to
admit motor vehicles. Therefore, fire protection is a serious problem,
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particularly in settlements where many of the houses have wood and tarpaper,
or canvas, roofs.
As was already mentioned, the formation of squatter dwellings in Korea
is the result of an imbalance between the immigrants into the city, and the
social capacity to accept them, precisely because of the rapid rate of urban-
ization. Thus, unlike many of the slums of the Western cities, most of the
slum and squatter settlements in Korea display the characteristics of the
10
"urban village" as described by Gans. In Western cities, the slum has been
regarded as the physical remains of a social disorganization U However,
in Korea the squatter dwellings have a real .function, as an area of trans-
ition. 12 The people in the area bear the characteristics of the so-called
"marginal man", In other words, if the immigrant into the city is accepted
into the industrial development of the city, the problems of the squatter
dwellings may not be serious. After all, it is the population who are not
accepted into the industrial development, of which the urban poor and the
squatter dwellers, are composed. Therefore, the social characteristics of
squatter dwellers are different ones from the poorer inhabitants of Western
cities.
A'field survey of the social characteristics of urban squatter dwellers
identified several common traits. The first of these is that most of the
squatter dwellers come from a rural area; an average 87.1% of the total
respondents come from a rural area. Even in the rural area, they come from
towns and centers of a rural area.
The second shared characteristic is that they are mostly of working age.
The median age is in the early thirties; 51% of the total migrant population
fall -into this age group. Surprisingly, 94.5% of the total migrant population
are between twenty and fifty, while the population as a whole between this
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age group is 36 percent. Therefore, it has been evident that the migrant
squatter communities have provided a constant surplus of manpower that com-
petes for all the unskilled jobs in the city. Seoul entrepreneurs have
found that most rural migrants ar tough, industrious, conscientious workers.
Many companies, particularly those in the modern sector, are primarily con-
cerned with a prospective employee's educational attainments. But small,
self-made plant owners, who provide very low wages and on-the-job training,
find that recruitment of young people in the villages, or among newly-arrived
migrants, is advantageious. This kind of labor demand can be amply met by
the "labor pool" in the slum and squatter community. 13
The third trait is that they are well educated. Less than 3% of the
male migrants under the age 45 had no schooling at all. However, 49% had
at least some high school education, and surprisingly 21% had some college
training, or were college graduates. -This means that migrants had high po-
tential- for adaptability, adjusting rapidly to urban life.
The fourth is that the migrant's ambition and desire to advance in the
urban context appears to be much greater than that of the urbanites.
This was evidenced by a report that shows that the rate of home ownership
among the nigrants in the slum and squatter dwelling areas was higher than
the rate of home ownership of the total households in Seoul. The home owner-
ship rate in Seoul had been reported to be 54.7% of the total households,
while a survey conducted in a sample squatter community showed that 78.8% of
14
the migrant families own their house, in one form or another. This fact
indicates that a large portion of the migrants had been able to find a
place to live within their financial means.
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Finally, unlike other city residents, the squatter residents' social
solidarity was very strong, showing a good relationship with their neighbors.
Therefore, unlike the social characteristics of people of the slumsin
the Western cities, the Korean squatters provide the rapidly-industrialliz ing
cities with very productive labor forces. Although.they live in the squatter
dwellings, due to the low income status, they are people of high potential
for productivity, if an opportunity for such are given. On the other hand,
if the opportunities are not given, they can react through collective action
against the society.
Generally speaking, the squatter area has a function of a station, or
shelter, in which the upward social mobility of the migrant, and downward
social mobility of others, transpires; a so-called two-way station of social
transition. This condition is possible in the situation where rapid indus-
trialization is taking place, and where job opportunities are constantly
expanding. Otherwise, the squatter dwellings may be a permanent station in
the situation in which they are not relevant stations.
The income level of squatter dwellings was an average monthly 15,166
won, compared poorly to the average montly income of Seoul's other house-
holds (27,820 won). Meanwhile, the squatters spent a large portion of
their income for their food and education for their children, while middle
income urban households spent a relatively large portion of their income
for housing. In some households, they had about a deficit of 10,000 won.
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4. A Package Program of Urban Removal of Squatter Dwellings
As Chapter Three pointed out, during .the sixties and early seventies
the Korean economy experienced a fast rate of growth. However, the fast
rate of economic expansion created many socio-economic and urban
problems. The concentration of expansion in a few growth poles, including
the largest cities and some industrial centers, increased the gap between
urban and rural incomes, but also between regions. In.1965, the average
monthly income per farm household (6.1 persons) was 9,350 won, compared to
a figure of 9,300 won per city wage earner's household (5.3 persons). How-
everby 1969 the figures were 18,150 won and 27,800 won, respectively.1
In cities, rapid growth created a shortage of housing and public facilities.
Furthermore, these deficiencies gave rise to political and social problems.
In order to solve these concurrent problems, the Korean government gradually
opened its eyes to the ongoing physical reformation of its cities and nation-
al land, and prepared the basic guidelines for a long-term National Land
Development Plan (10 years).
In 1966, the Korean government named Hyeon Ok Kim as Mayor of Seoul
city. He was the former Mayor of Busan, which is the second largest city
in Korea, and where he had conducted Korea's first large-scale urban renewal
program. As soon as he was appointed, he replaced two vice Mayors and
seven chiefs of bureaus, and announced that 50% of the city's yearly budget
would be invested in what he called "Urban Development Projects". This
signaled a revolutionary departure from the tradition of municipal admini-
stration of Seoul, in which almost all of the total budget had been spent
for administrative operational expenditures.
Within half a month of his appointment, the new Mayor inaugurated six
pedestrian under-passes and over-passes near the central business district,
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extended five major arterial roads from the center into outlying suburbs,
and extended water pipelines. The Mayor, however, immediately found out
that, whenever his development projects proceeded, there were hundreds of
squatter dwellings to be cleaned for the public works to proceed. This was
his first encounter with the problems associated with the squatters: and he
began to think about a long-range solution for them. 2
Meanwhile, in the summer of 1966, hundreds of squatter. dwellings along-
side the Han River bank were swept away by a flood tide. As a result, about
520 households of squatter dwellings lost their shelters and became refugees. 3
In January and May of the same year, two big fires destroyed the Namsan and
Sooingdong squatter areas, creating 650 households of refugees.4 The main
reason of this conflagration was poor urban facilities, such as an insuffici-
ent water supply system and poor road conditions to access to the squatter
areas; deficiencies which were the object of urban development programs.
These three incidents made the squatterproblem a controversial politi-
cal issue in Seoul, widely dealt with in most of the major daily newspapers
in the city. The editors of most of the city's newspapers voiced demands
that the government provide permanent legal housing for the squatter-dwel-
lers. Yet, at the same time, most of them appeared to prefer clearance of
the squatters, describing as "unsightly scenes" of the city.
Before the national election of both the President and the National
Assembly (Congress) in May of 1967, prospective candidates issued statements
concerning the squatters. The general tone of these statements supported
the "legalization" of squatter dwellings as they were, and criticized
Kim's urban policies. Neither were the Mayor's policies supported by budget
and urban planning officials: by that time the city government already had
a deficit of 87 million won from five of the city's banks. 5 During this
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period, the new Mayor stopped all squatter clearance actions, to make way
for public work projects, and ordered his bureau to study the squatter
housing issue as a whole.
Before the comprehensive plan was prepared, in 1966 the city government
investigated the actual conditions of Seoul's squatter dwellings. According
to this data, the total number of squatter dwellings in Seoul city was
136,650 units, 230,000 households, and 1,270,000 persons. The figure of
136,650 units became the new Mayor's target for solving the problem of
squatter dwellings. In order to clean unconditionally the new squatter dwel-
lings built after January 1, 1967, the city government enforced registration
of all squatter dwellings.
According to this registration, the actual conditions of squatter
dwellings were as follows6
Number of Units by Land Use
Total Forestry River Site Bank Site Road Site Private Land Others
136,650 39,923 13,567 4,502 6,167 60,550 11,941
By Year
Total 1966 1965 1964 1963 1962 before 1961
136,650 11,824 8,612 7,118 7,330 13,358 88,408
By Structure
Total Tent Wood Simple-frame Block Brick
136,650 4,512 27,964 13,309 88,187 2,678
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On the basis of this data, the city government prepared three different
programs within a comprehensive plan for solution of the squatter problem.
This trifold approach was adopted in recognition of the constraints posed
by the city government's resources, as well as the effectiveness of various
means of control, their being insufficient to deal with a problem of such
huge scale within the confines of a single program.
Largely on the basis of the program-cost minimization consideration,
46,000 units of housing were to be legalized; some 14,0 00 units were to be
torn down and housed in the new apartments; and finally, 76,650 units were
to be relocated into a new town.
Legalization Program
This program legalized existing settlements, thereby improving the
housing conditions of the squatters by granting their right to settle on
public land, under the following conditions: a) Settlements must be
located on land not reserved for military or other critical public purposes,
b) settlements must be situated so that roads and other necessary infrastruc-
ture may be constructed without undue interference with the city's develop-
ment plans, c) settlements must be located on a site less than 100 meters
above sea level,and d) settlements must have a minimum of thirty houses. 7
For those settlements that meet these criteria, the process of legali-
zation had three phases. First, community facilities had to be upgraded to
meet minimum standards. In particular, main roads were required to be of a
minimum width, and storm drainage adequate. Second, all lots in the communi-
ty had to be at least 89 square meters (27 pyeong) in size, and all houses
at least 40 square meters. No house would be allowed to occupy more than
60% of the lot on which it stood. To meet these standards, much or all of
the land in the settlements would have to be reallocated, and many or most
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houses would have to substantially altered, or destroyed and constructed
anew. After community facilities and house and lot size met city standards,
residents would be permitted to move to the third phase of the process;
8purchase of a land title from the city
Although the first phase of legalization process (that was, basically
to upgrade the squatter community site and infrastructure) proceeded with
the government's substantial technical and financial assistance, the second
and third phases of the legalization program were almost entirely left up
to individual initiative. The first agenda that the government had to
decide upon was what kind of community facility improvement investment
could be best made, to serve not only the squatter area, but also the general
public. In cases where the public agency promoted a certain community
improvement project, it would contribute materials covering, on average, 35%
of the total cost of such improvements. The remaining estimated costs were
left to be covered by community households, through their share in cash or
in labor. The actual construction was to be left to private firms, through
competitive bidding, and carried out under the supervision of a district
office. From the point of view that the priority of the city government was
to provide the designated squatter areas with access roads, pedestrian ways,
and other public utilities, the major aspects of legalization process for
the qualifying squatters had been to simplify the procedures for granting
house construction permits, and the willingness to sell to private users
land originally planned for public use. Nevertheless, the city had never
indicated any policy of providing easier credit towards the costs of raising
the quality of squatter dwellings to meet the defined minimum standards.
The main reasons for adoption of a program of legalization of squatter
dwellings by Seoul city government numbered five: the first was that the
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function of planning law was impractical. In other words, public park,
forestry, river site, road and bank site zoning plans failed to fulfill their
functions, because housing already occupied the areas completely. Even
though some of the places were cleared, the place could not recover to i/ts
planned function. In this case, it was better to keep it as it had been,
rather than to clear the squatter dwellings.
The second reasons was the stabilization of the living base for the
poor. If the city government cleared the squatter dwellings, the socio-
economic relationship based around the area would cease functioning at that
time. Therein lay the necessity of stabilizing the living conditions of the
squatters.
The third factor was the condition of the city government's budget. In
the case of the clearance and resettlement of the squatter dwellings, the
cost was too high. For example, the total costs to clean and resettle
one squatter dwelling was 7,200 won. If the number of squatter dwellings
to be removed and resettled were 46,000 units, the cost would be about 33
million won. Therefore, legalizing 46,000 units of squatter dwellings, the
city could save 33 million won. This cost was for a normal situation; in
the case of a large housing development, or an accident, the cost would
naturally be higher.
A fourth incentive was reduction of the housing shortage. Without
clearing the squatter dwellings, and with the improvement of them, these
dwellings could augment the existing housing supply.
The final reasons was that the city government could achieve a. goal
of a fine sight of. squatter dwellings, improving some of them with public
facilities.
Therefore, the city government announced that in the first stage,
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15,000 units among the total squatter dwellings would be legalized, and
28,794 pyeong of public land would be released from existing zoning re-
strictions. Accordingly, the city government legalized 11,036 units of
squatter dwellings in the first year (1967), providing 17,000-20,000 won
per unit for the cost of building materials, such as cement, block and
slate.9
However, in the course of implementing the program, several problems
emerged. The most important problem was a misunderstanding on the part of
10
squatter dwellers with respect to the intent of the legalization program.
That is to say, they thought that the mandate of the legalization program
was to approve the existing right to live as it had been, with minor improve-
ments to the dwelling, such as painting an exterior wall. Another problem
was caused by the squatter dwellers inability to pay for extra services, such
as the cost of land survey, public facilities, and disposal of land. As one
can see from the income level of squatter dwellers noted in chapter 3, it
was impossible to pay any extra costs except food cost.
Furthermore, it was an election year when the city government prepared
this legalization program. Thus, regardless of whether the candidates in
the coming election were members of a ruling party or of an opposition party,
they all supported the legalization program to gain the political support
from the poor. In such a political environment, most squatter dwellers.
thought that the legalizationprogram was a kind of electional generosity
for the poor.
The end result of all of this was increased squatter dwelling construc-
tion. During the period of both elections, about 1,000 units of new
squatter dwellings per month were built in the area of Haweolgockdong, Seong-
buckdong,, Jeongneon, and Sae geumjeon.11 After the elections, however, the
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city government took a form position regarding squatter dwellings. One of
the measures taken was to remove the new squatter dwellings by force. The
city government organized a special task force for this purpose.
In spite of these measures on the part of the city government, new
squatter dwellings were built continuously--like mushrooms after a rainfall--
a new unit of squatter dwellings could be built just overnight. There were
even some companies which made a business of building squatter dwellings
commercially for the poor. During the period of 1967 to March, 1968,
16,159 units of squatter dwellings were built.12 In response to this situa-
ti:on, the Mayor took another stronger measure: the Building Act was revised
to provide that the city government with the power to prosecute the head of
a squatter household for a criminal offense, in the case of the violation
of the removal order by the city government. The Act prescribes that if a
:squatter dwelling household violates the rule to keep the city's removal
order, the head is liable to serve a prison sentence of less than six months.
Consequently, the city government sent a notification to all heads of
household of squatter dwellings. The contents of the notification were
that, if the head of a household did not remove his squatter dwelling within
the term of removal, then he would be criminally charged.
The first reaction against this stronger government measure was the
demonstration of the residents of Yeonheedong.1 3 They came to the City
Hall and asked the Mayor to keep to the terms of the squatter dwelling
legalization program. However, the city government rejected their request,
by arguing that their squatter dwellings were not subject to the legalization
program because they had been built after announcing the- legalization program.
In Yeonheedong, which was the first case of implementation of the new
removal pplicy, the Seodaemoon District Office, with the support of a 120
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member task force, removed 390 units of the squatter dwellings in the
Yeonheedongsan 82, 66, 65 and 87.14 Nevertheless, another new 150 units
of squatter dwellings were built within two or three days. Again, the
Seodaemoon District Office removed the new squatter dwellings, with the
aid of police task forces. Such a removal war could be protracted over
many rounds of struggles: According to the chief of the City Planning
Bureau, wars of this sort extended to 17 rounds in some of the squatter
areas.
The removal war of the squatter dwellings, and the demonstration of
the squatter people, moved public opinion to criticize the legalization pro-
gram. Most newspapers had begun to criticize the legalization program
openly:
" The most important problem was the announcement of the
legalization program of the Mayor........
In light of solving the shortage of housing, the lega-
lization of the squatter dwellings is not economic and
in terms of the squatter dwellings the program is not
valued............... Although the first responsibility
of building the squatter dwellings is in the people of
the squatter dwellings.
The city government can not avoid the seconds responsi-
bility. In any case, the basic problem is in the shor-
tage of housing, in particular the low-income housing"
Therefore, the city government sought bas.ic and permanent measures
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to deal with the issue of squatter dwellings, in relation to the need for
low-income housing in Seoul.
Citizen's Apartments
Given the above situation, the Mayor ordered the chief of the City
Planning Bureau to build a frame-type apartment as a demonstration apartment
valued at W 10,000,000 unit cost, or W 500 monthly payment, in one area.
He also ordered plans for the construction of the 100 units of apartments
Before construction of those apartments, the city government conducted
several experimental apartment projects.15 Hangang Citizen's Apartments
was the first case of the experimental citizen's apartment. The conditions
of entering into the apartment was W 500,000 - 700,000 downpayment and
W 200,000 monthly payment. These fees were prohibitively expensive for
squatter dwellers; therefore, many apartments remained vacant for several
months, and the project ultimately failed. The city government had consider-
ed another experimental citizen's apartment building which was a kind of
half-burden citizen's.apartment, without downpayment. In other words, the
entering citizen supplied the land and the city government offered the con-
struction cost as.a loan repaid monthly. Although 124 households were
accomodated in this apartment, it was also too expensive for the squatter
people. Therefore, no more than this apartment building was built. After
that, the city government built a third experimental citizen's apartment,
the so-called "Sky-Apartment." In this case, the constructor financed the
construction cost, and then the Housing Bank refunded the money to the
constructor. The entering residents paid W 600,000, or labor time equivalent.
to that amount, before moving into the apartment. After taking possession of
the apartment, the citizen paid a monthlypayment of W 7,400 towards repay-
ment of the Housing Bank loan. This apartment was also sufficiently
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expensive to present a heavy burden on the squatter dwellers. Finally,
the city government considered another experimental citizen's apartment;
one which would be able to reduce the burden of the citizen to a minimum.
The basic idea of the apartment was that the city government built just
the structural shell of the apartment; a 'frame-type' apartment; the
entering citizen completed the interior construction such as internal walls,
finished floors, heating systems, sanitary fittings and cupboards. After
the construction of this apartment, most of the citizen's apartments were
this frame type of apartment, in terms of the method of the moving and
the physical structure.
During the removal war, the city government contracted with Dongjin
Architecture Association to design 17 units in Keumwha area, and 2 units in
Hyeochang area.16 But the people of the squatter dwellings in these areas
interrupted the research work; completion of basic tasks, such as surveying
the land were hampered because of the resistance of the squatter people.
Therefore, the builders were forced to work behind the normal housing,
or under the mountains. In such a situation, it was impossible to do a
geological survey to properly set up a pillar of the apartment. The lack of
such a geological survey forced several changes in the location of the apart-
ment. At last, within budget limitations, they were forced to set up a
pillar without finding out an appropriate place.
In any case, the city government had started the construction of the
citizen's apartment with W 11,660,000 of the net construction cost for a
unit according to the design which had been made by the Dongjin Architec-
ture Association. *Those apartments had been almost built by the end of
1968. As the construction proceeded, the citizen's group which
had rejected the project at the beginging had gradually changed their
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attitudes into the direction of cooperation. Consequently, the 450
squatter dweller households which were accepted to move into the apartment
had established a self-committee by each Dong,so as to deal with various
problems. The function of the self-committee was to confirm which citizen
of the squatter dwellings were moved into the new unit, to decide the buil-
ding unit and the apartment room to be moved into by lottery, and to dis-
cuss the fund for interior construction included the cost of the partition
of dividing each household, wall of each room, sanitary unit for 10 house-
holds, water supply, and electricity. The fund was approximately W 70,000
for each household. However at the time of collecting the fund, only 10 %
of 450 household had the ability to pay W 70,000 for the cost of the inte-
17
rior construction. An additional problem was raised as to the land of the
site. Twenty percent of the total land (80,000 pyeong) was private land,
purchase of which should be negotiated with the private owner. In the case
of negotiation, the cost had to be added to the new burden for the citizen.
In this situation, some of them had sold the allotment card for payments
ranging from W 100,000 at the minimum to the maximum W 200,000. The citizen
of the squatter dwellings who had sold the allotment card could be building
another new squatter dwelling in another area. In response to this situa-
tion, the city government regulated the allotment card so as not to be sold
within one year. However, this regulation was not effective.
As a matter of fact, even the fund of the interior construction was
a heavy burden for the squatter people in the. light of their income.
A study of the squatter family's monthly income and patterns of consu-
mption preference conducted by Institute of Urban Studies and Develop-
ment, Yonsei University, shows that median monthly consumption for a
family of five persons was W 20,205 while their monthly income was
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W 20,457 which explains their life at subsistence level8 The survey
also shows that the squatter family spends the highest portion of its
income for food, the next highest for education. On the average,
squatters do not have funds to spend for housing. However, since they
are squatters they do not have to pay rent, and their residence are close
to the place of work so that they do not pay transportation expenses.
However, living in the citizen's apartment project forced economic and
cultural pressures on the squatters by imposing financial burdens to
pay off mortgages. Each household must pay W 2,385 monthly over a fift-
een year period. It is obvious that the cost of the apartment to the
resident over 15 years is far greater than the value of the apartment.
Furthermore, the average livinq cost is far more than it .appears.
Thus, the initial costs of moving into the citizen's apartment were extremely
high, and most of the former squatter dwellers not only used up any capital
resources they had, but in a great many cases, they also went heavily into
18
debt.
Therefore, in discussing the cost of living in the apartments, these
moving expenses and debts (which did not originally appear in family budgets)
should be considered. In other words, if money is desperately needed for
education, business investment, etc., a household was likely to have already
exahsted its financial resources in order to obtain ownership of the apart-
ment. The study of Kim and Podgursky indicates that 75% of the original
recipients of citizen's apartments in two project areas were forced to borrow
at interest rates of 5-6% per month (annually 60-72%).9 Therefore, in some
of the projects only 30% of the units passed to outside buyers, while in
others perhaps over 70% of the original occupants sold out. 20
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In spite of this situation, the construction of the citizen's apartments
proceeded continuously, and the project was completed on February 27, 1968.
Based on this experience, the city government announced the citizen's apart-
ment plan: the city government would build 2,000 units of citizen's apart-
ments. After the announcement of this apartment plan, most of the citizens
of the squatter dwellings paid attention to future execution. The purpose
of the plan was to solve the low-income housing problems through a mutually
satisfactory arrangement with the squatter dwellings. The method of the
plan was that the city government built the structure shell of the apartment
like a frame type, leaving the entering citizen to complete the interior
works, without paying any downpayment; that is, as a partnership project
between the city government and'the citizen of the squatter dwellings. The
period of the plan was 3 years. According to this time schedule, in
the first year the city government would build 400 units for 18,000
households, the second and third years, 800 units.
In the first year again, the projectwas divided into two periods; the
first half year was 284 units,and the secondhalf year 116 units.
Priorities for selecting the entering citizens were as follows;
1) household which had removed '.itself from a squatter dwelling
in the project area
2) household which had an appropriate property right
3) an exemplary policeman( a household in each unit)
4) even if some had a right, if he sold the allotment card,
it becomes invalid.
In accordance with this apartment plan, the city government had
revised its whole policy regarding squatter dwellings. That is to say,
the target of the legalization program was reduced to half(35,000 units)
of the original target, and Kwangju relocation target was fixed 55,000
51
units (78,000 households). In addition, the task of the citizen's apart-
ments was delegated to the District Office.
When President Park visited the Seoul City Hall on Feb. 19, 1969,
he particularly praised the citizen's apartment construction program. At
the seminar in which all the ministers, governors, and chiefs of the
counties participated, the President also praised the Seoul city government
for the idea and implementation of the citizen's apartments.
Most of the Seoul citizens also commented positively on the project.
In any case, the higher hill which had been covered with the squatter
dwellings had been changed into one covered by high-rise the citizen's
apartments; few argued that the change was not for the better.
However, the Mayor, from early August had worried about the building of
the citizen's apartment, and the obstacles thereto. There had been serious
problems in the apartments, not only in the physical structure, but also in
the interior. In spite of the neat appearance of the citizen's apartments,
the basic quality of the housing construction and foundation work was unsta-
ble. Many of the apartment buildings had developed cracks, although the
subcontractor had tried to prevent further cracking by adding a few legs
on the precipitous slopes. Housing specialists and architects pointed out
the reasons for many of the building construction problems as follows:
First, because the city government wanted to complete construction in
a short period, many of the buildings were built hurriedly in cold weather
when cement couldn't solidify before freezing. In such cases, the structures
became fragile. Furthermore, groundwork done on frozen ground could make
the whole building unstable.
Secondly, in addition to construction flaws, many of the buildings
could not be built on flat sites; as a result, nearly half of all the build-
ings were rooted on the ground, but the fronts were left in the air,
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supported by thin pillars of 30 cm by 60 cm. It was later found that the
pillars were not firmly rooted in the ground. Because sloped areas were
usually rocky, the construction companies did not bother to dig the rocky
bed to rest the pillars on the surface.
Thirdly, most of the buildings were built with inadequate materials.
Iron reinforcement was not sufficient, and the cement and sand combi-
nation was not appropriate. The city government allocate:l2 million won
for the construction of each of the buildings while architects warned that
a normal building of that size requires about three times more. Many of
the citizens believed that a considerable amount of the construction funds
flow into the pockets of the persons in charge of supervision of the
construction.
Furthermore, accidents had been taking place in the inside of the apart-
ments, includin9 gas poison and leakages from the ceiling. Since the apart-
ments had been built so badly, complementary construction had to be executed.
Therefore, on January 24, 1970, the city government conducted a safety inspec-
tion of the buildings to prevent the occurrence of a serious accident.
According to the results of the safety inspection 21, 10 units of the apart-
ments, housing 363 households, were sub-standard. Based on the results of
the safety inspection, the city government executed repairs. However, the
city government could not do basic up-grading because of a limited budget.
Meanwhile, the building supervision staff was insufficient to check the
schedule of the construction, and enforcement was poor. According to one of
the senior officers, one building supervisor had the responsibility for in-
specting 46 units of apartment construction.
At the beginning of the construction program, the. problem of land for
the citizen's apartment was postponed by the approach of the build-now-
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solve-later attitude of the city government. In the cases of city-owned
land, acquisition was presented as no problem. The only problems were
presented in the cases of national government owned land. Using the public
park land gave the city government one recourse to due process. The Apart-
ment Management Office asked the Department of Planning of the city of
Seoul to rezone the public park land into the residential land, for building
of the citizen's apartments. The Department of Planning submitted the item
of the change to the City Planning Committee on April 4, 1970; and, after
several meetings, it passed. Finally, the city government applied to the
Ministry of Construction, and submitted the item to the Central Committee of
City Planning (CCCP). The CCP criticized the item as an illegal measure,
and noted critically that the apartment had already been built. However,
given this very fact, the CCP had to approve the land use as a fait accompli.
In the early morning of April 8, 1970, one of the Whawoo Citizen's Apart-
ments, the 15-unit (total floor space of 330 pyeong) collapsed. The 60
persons (15 households) which occupied the building were buried; 33 persons
died, and about 40 persons were injured. 22  Unfortunately, this apartment
was one of the 406-unit model apartments built in the last year. Most people
thought that this event resulted from a combination of design mistakes, the
poor construction, corruption of the public servants concerned, and in parti-
cular, an overly ambitious plan. And so, attention was paid to the position
of the Mayor.
An outstanding planner, Choog-up Kim criticized the collapse of the
citizen's apartment, calling it the logical result of "demonstration admini-
stration". Although the purpose of building the citizen apartments was to
remove the squatter dwellings and to move the squatter peopl.e into the apart-
ments, the demonstration effect accrued from the fact that a lot of
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apartments were built on the hill, where they would be highly visible to
city residents. Actually, the powerful construction companies had avoided
building the citizen's apartment because of their unreasonably low construc-
tion budget. Therefore, only weaker construction companies, which were
trying to enter the industry, were interested in the citizen's apartments;
companies which typically do not have enough engineers. On the other hand,
public servants always were intere.sted in the intention of their bosses,
rather than the intention of the citizens. In such a situation, even if
they had tried, the engineer's advice would not have been heeded by the
public agencies. In the case of the Whawoo apartment collapse, there were no
advisory groups in terms of engineering under the Mayor.
The preacher Park, Hyeonkyu, also criticized it in the special lecture
"The Collapse of Whaoo Apartment and Citizen's Interest".
"The style of modernization should not be Whaoo style
as in the case of Whawoo Apartment collapse. The all
the things under the beauty name of modernization had
to be reconsidered again, such as the vertical power
structure by which everyone looks up".
Another planner criticized the housing policy.
"The event was the responsibility of the government which had
notprepared to pay for middle-class of construction company
The unrealistic cost of the construction which did not
give any profits to the construction companies encouraged
the company to build a poor apartment construction.
Furthermore, the Housing .Corporation established for
a low-income housing had avoided the construction of
citizen's apartment and built high class of mansion apartments
and foreigner's housing to make profits. This housing
policy was unbalanced."
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However, in spite of such criticism, some of the citizen's still had
supported the ambition of the Mayor Kim. In terms of "ambition", Mayor
Kim was unequalled, although not all newspapers were sympathetic to his
aims.
Meanwhile, with just one year left until the general election, the
ruling party worried about the impact of Whawoo Apartment event on urban
voter support. During the period of the election campaign, the ruling party
normally emphasized urban votes. However, the Whawoo Apartment event endan-
gered urban voting support; the opposition party used this to their advan-
tage, and attacked the ruling party with claims of responsiblity for the
Whawoo Apartment tragedy. Furthermore, opposition politicians strongly ar-
gued that the present government should bear not only the political responsi-
bility, but also the criminal responsibility for the event.
Mayor Kim had -been a strong mayor since his tenure as Mayor of Busan
city: therefore, all the responsibility for the Whaowoo Apartment collapse
was placed upon him. After eight days, he offered his resignation to the
President, after reporting the sitatuion. The President had not shown any
response immediately to his resignation. After looking around the scene of
the accident, the Prime Minister called to the Mayor to set up emergency
measures for the dead and the injured. It thus seemed that the status of
the Mayor would remain to be seen until the immediate problems were solved.
However, although his resignation was postoned, and in spite of his brilliant
performance in building Seoul city, the public opinion had changed to the
disadvantage of the Mayor.
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Meanwhile, the ruling party suggested that the Mayor should be replaced.
In this situation, the President announced, on April 6 1970, that the Mayor
had resigned. As a result, the city government project of the multi-
family blocks of citizen's apartments -- built with the motto of "An Apart-
ment for Each Homeless Household" -- ended as a grotesque fiasco. The
catastrophe of the Whawoo Apartments led to the end of the city government's
low-cost citizen's apartment program.
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5. Kwangju Relocation Program
At the same time the citizen's apartments program was launched, Seoul
city government also embarked upon a new town scheme. This was designed to
solve two sets. of problems. First, it -at least to a certain extent,
would help solve the "squatters housing" problem, and at the same time,
contribute to alleviating the population congestion in the center area of the
city proper. The problems caused by congestion in the central area of the
city (e.g., traffic jams, insufficient provision of public facilities such
as vehicular roads, and pedestrian passage, etc.) had been a topic of public
and media conversation since the mid-1960s. And the "squatters" settlements
near the center of the city were very often blamed for the overall congestion
problems.
Within this context, Mayor Kim had the support of the national govern-
ment (including the President)- of the citywide government, as well as favor-
able public opinion for clearing and relocating a substantial number of
"unsightly" squatter houses from the central area of the capital city. The
idea of relocation of squatters into a new town was, however, constrained by
two factors:2 first, the number of squatters in Seoul that the government
wanted to have removed was quite large; and secondly, there was a scarcity
of capital with which to develop a large resettlement area. To achieve the
objectives of the first constraint, the government had to forceably resettle
many of the squatters. To get around the problems presented by the second
situation, the government attempted to work out a scheme by which the
development of the resettlement area would be self-financing. "Forceably"
resettling the squatters, somewhere other than in the center of Seoul, was
designed to achieve an outcome of the new town development process, such
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that the resettled squatters would not come back to Seoul to resquat. The
second constraint necessitated use of a funding means outside the bounds of
the city government's existing financial sources.
In order to match those purposes, the location should be outside the
sphere of Seoul metropolitan area's sphere of urban economic function, but
within a distance sufficiently convenient for Seoul to control its develop-
ment process. According to this principle, the location was to be in An area
within 30 km. radius of the center of Seoul, also taking into consideration:
(a) relative land prices, (b) the availability of continguously open space
of approximately 3,500,000 pyeong, and (c) relative costs of development.
Before deciding on the Kwangju area as a location of the new town site, the
city government selected three proposed sites. However, the two sites other
than the Kwangju area were not accepted for reasons of cost and military
defense. The selection and purchase of the location, within the physical
limit of the size and distance as noted above, was to look for the cheapest
possible site. "Speculation" in the private land market was the main cause
of land price increase around Seoul and therefore, that by blocking any
information leak of the site-selection process, the city's purchase would
gain the benefit of exclu'sion of the "speculative" price. For this reason,
the possibility of using eminent domain proceedings was excluded, for to do
so would involve a protracted procedure and a large number of participants
(as required by law), thereby precluding effective information control.
Thus, the actual site-selection was undertaken by the Mayor himself
with the help of only two other members of his staff -- the Deputy Mayor,
and the director of the Bureau of City Planning. It was believed that, not
only because of the lack of information on the future development project
(the owners, who happened to be mostly farmers, would not be involved in
61
any speculative buying and selling), but also because a show of authority
would convince the owners to sell only to the city. The initial purchase
move was indeed made swiftly -- in a month in early 1968 -- according to
the tactics contemplated. The same tactics were to be followed in the suc-
ceeding purchase (the staging of purchases was done to match the availability
of financial resources, on the part of the city).
Consequently, in May 1968 the government announced that -the Kwangju
area would be the location of the new town. After getting the approval of
the governor of Kyeonggi Province and the site housing business project
from the Ministry, the city government immediately developed the detailed
project plan; one which was mainly based on the clearance plan of the squatter
dwellings. On June 11, 1968, the mayor of Seoul had announced that the city
government would build 3,500,000 pyeong of housing at the site, and remove
500,000 households into the development.
According to the Mayor's announcement, the city government prepared a
large-scale site formation plan, which was implemented during the period
from 1968 to 1973. The settlement was planned to have a population of
350,000 by 1974, i.e. within five years of the initial construction, in
1968. Some 278,000 of the total population of 350,000 were to be relocated
squatters, and the remainder were to be made up of voluntary settlers.
The schedule for relocation and settlement of squatters from the city
of Seoul into the new town was as follows:
Relocation Schedule of Squatters
Year 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 total
Households 3,500 11,500 20,000 15,000 5,650 55,650
Population 20,000 55,000 100,000 75,000 28,000 278,000
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The total space of 3,500,000 pyeong was to be distributed to different
land use needs in the ratios indicated below*.
Land Use Plan
Use Classification
Residential
Commercial
Indusrial
Estate No. 1
Estate No. 2
Public Facilities
Road
Government
Schools
Market
Park
Total
Quantity
(Pyeong)
1,555,266
260,000
240,000
50,870
189,130
942 ,734
730,660
25,870
152,000
22,204
5,000
3,000,000
% of Total
51.4
8.7
8.0
1.7
6.3
31.9
25.0
1,0
5.0
0.7
0.2
100%
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The new town was designed to be primarily a residential city, along with
approximately 72 small and medium size labor-intensive light industries.
Industrial Estate No. 1 (the smaller in scale of the two) was to be
located near the town center, while Estate No. 2 was located at the fringe
of the town. The commercial functions were to be limited to neighborhood
shopping, the zone of which was planned alongside the major access roads of
the town. All of the residential housing lots for the-relocated squatters
(278,000) were to be of equal size: 20 pyeong (720 sq. ft.) of single, de-
tached houses. For the voluntary settlers, there was no maximum lot size
limitation, only the minimum size of 20 pyeong. 342,291 (11.4%) pyeong of
the total residential use land (51.4%), and any portion of the commercial
zone land, were to be sold to voluntary settlers, and mixed with relocated
squatters. Two public elementary schools, one public junior middle and
another senior middle school, were to be built by the government (giving
the Education Board will have jurisdiction over the town), and the sites
and access roads for two more private middle schools were to be developed.
All of the housing lots development for the relocated squatters, the
Industrial Estates site development, all of the public roads including
payment, sewers, and water pipelines installation were to be undertaken by
the city government at its own expense. For electricity connections, the
city government was to arrange a government load to the Korean Electricity
Corporation. Removal and relocation of the squatters for the city of Seoul
were to be carried out over a period of five years beginning in 1969, accord-
ing to the schedule as cited above.
Selection of 55,650 squatter-households out of the total of 136,650 sur-
veyed by the city government at the end of 1966 was to be based on three cri-
3
teria; (1) ownership of the squatters lots, i.e., public or private; (2) the
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age of construction; and (3) the quality of construction of the lands on
which a public work project is to be implemented in the scheduled year
(worst going first). Otherwise, the general principle applied in ordering
and selection of the houses to be cleared was a sort of weighted scale of
the points for (1) public ownership; (2) recentness of construction; and
(3) inferior construction quality, respectively. The first criterion was
for the economic expediency of the other public works, which were mostly
planned to use pubicly-owned lands because of the high land prices in the
vicinity of the center of the city. The second was applied to respect the
"vested interests" of the squatters this was believed necessary as a
means of securing political as well as economic feasibility of clearance
and relocation, since it was anticipated that the longer a resident's tenure
in the community, the stronger would be the resistance to clearance. Final-
ly, as it was planned for the city to pay for the costs incurred by clearance
and relocation, it was believed to be less costly to pay for demolition of
houses of lesser quality construction; hence, the reason for applying the
third criterion.
The first actual clearance act was to give notice to the residents to
voluntarily clear and move themselves; in cases of non-compliance, the city's
special task force was to be called in to demolish the houses. As for non-
compliance of relocation into Kwangju new town proper, the Resident Registra-
tion Law was to be invoked to deprive squatters of their Resident Registration
Cards, returning them only when the family moved into the new town.
On the other hand, the number of clearance and relocation instances was
synchronized with the progress of the development works in the new town,
especially with respect to the development of housing lots and access roads.
Provisions of the so-called "initial accomodation hardships" were also made
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in the form of temporary accomodation camps with a daily supply of minimum
food while the relocated squatters build their own houses, for only the
housing lots are to be developed before the squatters are relocated.4
For each unit of legally registered squatter households, 20 pyeong of hous-
ing lots were to be "sold", transferring the title on payment of the full
purchase price. The sale price was not to exceed the sum of costs of the
land purchase by the city, of the particular lot development, and of
ancillary "administrative expenditures, as allotted to the squatter's por-
tion. As it was actually calculated later, the average price was approxi-
mately W 2,000 per pyeong and thus, the average total payment by each house-
hold was approximately W 40,000 for 20 pyeong. The on-going market price
of the land was then four to eight times the city's sale price to the squat-
ters, depending on the specific location of the site. 5
The payment was repayable at W 20,000 per year for five years,
starting the third year after occupancy. Hence, residents were given
two years free of payments in which to concentrate resources on the de-
velopment of their homes before begining payments on the land. Owner-
ship of the land, moreover, would be retained by the government until
the resident had completed his payments. In the case of alternative
parties buying the land from the original settlers, the transaction
would be considered invalid by the city government unless a house were
built on the land. If so, then the land would be renegotiated with the
government at actual market value. This last consideration is import-
ant, as will be shown later considerable amounts of land were sold to
middle class owners and speculators, who were forced to build immediately
on the land to keep their holdings. In large part this was the factor
responsible for the later boom that ensued in Kwangju. Contrary to
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the observations of most observers, it was not the original settlers who
were building their houses, but rather the middle income families and spec-
ulators who had purchased the land from them. 6
At any rate, since the price of the housing lot scale to squatters was
to include the land-purchase costs paid by the city government, selection and
purchase cost of the new town location was to be made to minimize the purchase
cost so that the low sale price to squatters could be sufficient incentive
for them to settle in the new town. That is, the sales price and the legal
means of controlling the Resident Registration were planned to be the main
tools of the initial phase of the squatter settlement. To ensure longer term
settlement stability, job opportunities had to be created within the new
town. On the basis of an estimate that approximately 40% (110,000) of the
total relocated squatter population (278,000) was to be gainfully employed,
an equal number of residents should be provided with employment in on-site
manufacturing industries, by 1974, as to be "induced" into the Industrial
Estates of the town.7
The main means used to induce manufacturers to locate in the new town was
to sell land for the price estimated on the same kinds of criteria as applied
to the squatter's housing lots, beside the provisions of utilities, e.g.,
water-pipelines, electrification loans, and access roads, as planned for the
town as a whole. The incentive of cheap land prices was believed sufficient,
in consideration of the location's proximity to(within 30 km.)of Korea's
largest consumer marked -- Seoul -- and the existence of a sufficient and
suitable labor force in the town itself.
As for the voluntary settlers and commercial land users, neither positive
inducement measures nor particular negative control of the settlement were
provided; full reliance was placed on the market mechanism of land pricing, and
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the existing zoning and building regulations. That is, the land apportioned
to the voluntary settlers and the commercial users was to be sold by the
city for the on-going market price; sold to the highest bidders, within the
limits (quantative and qualitative) apportioned to these groups by the
overall development plan.8
In our investigation of the decision-making process, it was observed
that the single most important factor, perceived by the decision-makers to
be constraining the choice of alternatives, was the availability and con-
trol-effectiveness of the city's financial resources. As a result, it was
decided in principle that project investments were to be financially self-
supporting. That is, the expenditures on, and revenues from, the
project were to be balanced. For this purpose,
a "special account" was established for the Kwangju new town development.
As the table indicates, the expenditures for the relocated squatters and the
investment of industries accounted for almost 90% (W 5 billion) of the total,
while project costs to be borne by the two groups was only about one third
(W 2.9 billion) of the total. In order to benefit the two groups so much,
the land purchase appropriations that were to be paid to the original land
owners had to be limited; the sales of the "reserved land" to the voluntary
and business settlers were thus planed to bear the lion's share of the costs,
in view of the percentage allocations (approximately 20%) of land to these
groups.
The administrative systems of the -development process were organiza-
tionally dichotomous. 9 That is, the city government established the Kwangju
Field Office in the area, primarily to deal with the development affairs
such as land purchase, site development, public works, inducement of manu-
factures, and relocation of squatter people. On the other hand, the
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government of the Kyeonggi Province also established its own field office
in the area, by which the general administrative affairs such as citizen's
registration, public health, education, permission of building, and public
security. As a matter of fact, the relationship between the two organiza+
tions was quite -poor.
The development of Kwangju underwent essentially two phases, first
from 1968 to 1970, and afterwards during the period of mayor Taek-Shick
Yang's administration of the city of Seoul. During the first phase,
planning was grossly inadequate and water, sewage and electric facili-
ties were not yet installed, and squatters were forced to stake out
their houses and live in tents or makeshift shelters for the first few
months to a year. Financial assistance for the construction of houses
was non-existent, and because productive infrastructure had yet to be
built, employment was not to be had in the area. Moreover, public bus
service to Seoul at the time was both infrequent and slow. It was du-
ring this period that the largestmajority of settlers sold their lands
to return to squatting or doubling up with friends and relatives in
Seoul.
Clearance and moving of the squatters from the selected areas of
the city of Seoul was begin in June of 1969. The Kwangju Eield Office
records show that, by September of 1969, about 3,000 families or 15,000
former "squatter" population was cleared and moved into Kwangju. This
figure is only 500 households or 5,000 -people short of the planned
number. By early 1970 the number increased to 27,000 population in
41300 families. The city officials reported no serious resistance to
the clearance and /or relocation work, although about one third of the
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squatters waited for the city's demolition teams to destroy their original
dwellings. The city provided squatters with a means of transportation by
which they were allowed to take any pieces of building materials they could
manage to salvage, and to be reused in their new housing. As soon as they
were moved into Kwangju, 20 pyeong housing lots, a tent for every two
families, and a ration of flour were provided by the city for each family.
In the 4-5 month period of 1969, about 2,900 voluntary settlers moved
into Kwangju; this is the number identified in the Resident Registration
files. The city's field office estimate is that this is about 50% of the
total voluntary settlers in 1969.
The first project undertaken, in June of 1969, was the cOnstruction of
the main access street, and drainage at the center of the-town. Along with
these works, subdivision of the 20 pyeong housing lots was undertaken.
Community wells and sewer drainage connections (of the housing lots to the
main drainage) were built. In June 1970, construction of a water system was
begun-, to produce 4,000 tons of water per day. In September
1970 ground-breaking of Industrial Estate No. 1 for eight plants was
undertaken. The access-road to Seoul was still left unpaved; and around
the outer-fringe of the new town there was little sign of development
activities that needed any action on the part of the city's field office.
During the period after 1970, conditions improved somewhat when
transportation facilities to Seoul were improved, the first industries
began to operate, and large scale of public works and private construc-
tion began to absorb much of the excess labor in the area. By that time,
moreover, development began to gain momentum and land values began to
70
soar. Speculation become wide spread, and those who maintained their
lands in the area held or to them for whatever value they could command.
However, by that time, the majority of the original settlers had already
moved out. It was estimated that roughly two-thirds of the total orig-
10
inal population sold their lands to return to the city. On the other
hand, during the period of land value inflation, many original settlers
also sold their lands for whatever profit was available, and because of
the comprehensive controls on squatter that come into effect in Seoul
in 1970, squatted on the outskirts of Kwangju, building a house and
trying to survive in the economic of the satterlite city. Moreover,
the economic activity that was being generated during the later phase
of development also began to attract many squatters from Seoul, who came
to Kwangju to squat on the outskirts; thus, soon after 1970, a considerab-
le squatter population had begun to develop around the outskirts of Kwang-
ju itself.
In essence, aside from the problems of building a house from
literally nothing the primary problems facing the new town development were
that of employment opportunities in Kwangju, and the high cost that com-
munity incrued due to the limited budget of the low-income household.
Although it is not known to what extent squatters were able to profit from
their sale of land--to be able to either buy or rent a legitimate house
elsewhere--in addition to the large numbers of squatters who rented houses
and originally were displaced by removals in Seoul, an enormous number of
families are estimated to have been dislocated by the whole process.
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However, to understand the real nature of the problem from the
viewpoint of the original settler, it is necessary to appreciate the
tremendous dislocations and alterations in life style and economy that
11the resettlement of Kwangju involved. One basic of job security for
the squatter is his locational familiarity with the area in which he is
working. Hence, his knowledge of the people, institutions and situation
of the particular area in which he works, especially since, for a vendor.
("changsa"), small salesman, peddler, rear car puller, or A-frame porter
such knowledge is intimately related to his chances of business.
These relationships with his area in the form of personal network affect
his credibility, chances for credit, and the small face to face exchange
that determine the success of a day's labor. Radical transformation of
these locational ties can disrupt his sense of locational familiarity as
well as destroy the network of relationships that for him are critical
to the carrying out of his trade. In central city streamside areas, the
importance of the area for the survival of the squatter household was
seen to be of paramount importance. The Kwangju program disrupted this
whole pattern by making it too expensive for him to commute back and
forth, and difficult if not impossible to find work in Kwangju.
Therefore, those who were relocated to Kwangju were alreadu dis-
located in the truest sense of the word. Occupational possibilities that
12
remained open to them in Kwangju were basically four fold.
1) try to find out work in industries that were being established
there.
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2) work in public works projects that were being sponsored
by the government
3) try to eke out a small living as a peddler or start a
small store, or
4) try to get into the booming construction work that
began up to and after 1970
What generally tended to happen in these instances is explained below.
First, because of the initial high population concentration in the
area, demand for industrial jobs was much higher than job availability.
This had the immediate effect of lowering the prevailing wages for local
labor. This situation was also exacerbated by the fact that up to 1970,
there were only eight factories located in Kwangju. Moreover, because
of the mismatch between the vocational skills possessed by the average
low-income resident and those required for industrial jobs, job training
Was necessary. Those companies who did, soon came to believe that many
of the residents possessed neither the skill nor the intelligence to carry
out the required functions. Hence, the jobs that the residents did get were
usually the lowest paying and most menial of tasks, which was an indirect
insult to the intelligence of the resident. It also hampered his sense of
personal economic freedom (in which he might be able to go out and get
a higher paying but less stable job on his own and avoid the regular, but
low paying and demaning job in which he was employed), and resulted in
tensions between labor and management. Moreover, those industries that
were labor-intens.ive tended to hire only young girls, being as they were
more amenable to more strenuous conditions, more docile, and would accept
lower pay.
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During the later periods and after 1970 public works projects
were begun for the construction of roads and infrastructure as well as
the employment of labor in the area. However, the demand for works
projects was so high that although the pay was a reasonable 500 won a
day, the government was forced to resort to a system of work shifts in
order to allow more people to work. Therefore, a normal family head
would be able to work on a an average of three days a week for which
he was only able to earn 6,000 won a month.
Private employment was also revealed difficult by the fact that all
low level commercial and tertiary industries were generally located in
the same place in the central part of Kwangju area. Hence, there were
already too many people trying to engage in the same small scale pedd-
ling, and vending activities.
Also, as much of the land was held unoccupied for speculation (often
ironically, with houses built but no.one occupying them) the actual
resident population of higher income families which would have provided
the market for commercial activities was not very high. Of the two
basic small scale comme'rcial activities (small peddling or "changsa" and
porter services) peddling generally being done by the women, and carry-
ing services by the men. As a result, only a few women were able to hold
marginal occupation while the men generally remained idle.
Part of the large boom that accompanied the rise in land specula-
tion was the increase in building construction that occurred at the same
time. Some observers have pointed to this, in addition to the public
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works, as being construction of incomes in the area. However, such con-
clusions ignore the fact that practically all of the larger construction
work (i.e., that which required skilled labor) was being handled by private
construction firms based in Seoul. Smaller construction, such as the homes
of squatters, did not utilize outside labor, as the families were too poor
to afford it and the scale of construction was too small to require exten-
sive labor. Because all larger construction projects were based on out-
side firms, construction workers and carpenters, as well as other skilled
craftsmen, were generally from the outside and worked as employees of the
private firms. Only those who possessed prior skills in construction work
were able to get construction jobs. Private firms could not spend the time
and money to train workers on the spot. Thus, those non-skilled residents
who did get jobs usually received the most menial and low paying tasks,
which like public works and industrial jobs were generally relevant only
to those persons willing and able to accept hard labor and low wages. The
generally prevailing rate of unemployment in the area tended to further
exacerbate the whole process.
The immediate economic result was the inability of the resident fami-
lies to eke out a living in the new environment. If they were to try to
work in Seoul, the transportation costs, on a monthly aggregate basis, were
generally prohibitive. For instance, local bus transportation usually costs
W 60 for a round trip, with the ride taking one and a half to two hours.
On a monthly basis this would be roughly 10,000 won. Others able to afford
it used the express bus which, while faster (taking approximately an hour
to reach Seoul) cost 80 won for a round trip for W 2,400 a month.
Transportation costs, therefore accounted for one-tenth to one-quarter of
the monthly family income, which was too high for most families. On the
75
other hand, although some families have been able to have the family head
remain in Seoul, with other family members working in Kwangju to supple-
ment their income, the general percentage .of the population attempting
this tended to be relatively low.
On August 10, 1971, 30,000 residents of Kwangju staged a mass
demonstration in protest of government policy in the area.13  Destruction
was widespread, resulting in the burning of four government automobiles and
the local police substation, and the complete destruction of the Kwangju
Field Office of the city government. The complaints of the demonstrators
involved the sordid living conditions being experienced by the residents
at the time, and the city government policy, which had ignored the reality
of the conditions of the area.
Subsequent media investigations into the situation revealed that, at
the time of demonstration, Kwangju's total population (120,000 persons)
numbered only 42,000 of the original settlers, or roughly one third of
the total. Of the remaining two thirds, 21,600 (18 percent) were newcomers,
or higher-income people who had bought the land from the original settlers
for their own use, and the remaining 56,400 persons (roughly 50%) were those
who had moved into the area "illegally". These were primarily speculators
who were holding the land for future sales. In all, of the 120,000 persons
who had been moved into the area from squatter shacks in Seoul, two-thirds
had already left the area, having sold their lands to other parties.
Moreover, while the government had planned to locate 100 industrial
plants in the area by 1973, at the time of the demonstration, only seven
were in operation, employing 15,770 persons. City records at the time
revealed that 40,000 residents of the city were unemployed. Aside from
the enormous problems of unemployment, subsequent investigations into the
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area revealed that general living conditions for many of the residents
were also appalling. Squatters moving into the area generally faced the
prospect of having to purchase materials for the construction of their
house at inflated prices higher than what was available in Seoul.
Most of the families, having previously had their land allotments in
order to have money to buy food. In some of the peripheral areas of
the city, where temporary tent shelters were constructed, people were
suffering from large scale malnutrition and starvation. Many families
had somehow managed to survive the bitter winter living in tents with
no heat. Deaths were commonly reported.
Although immediate, government reaction to the demonstration, in the
face of widespread political criticism, was not without its irony.
14Remedial measures were essentially the following;
1) to distribute 2,500 tons of grains to more than 20,000 needy
residents to support them until the coming winter is over.
2) to reduce the provincial government imposed taxes on the res-
idents
3) to set up several employment guidance centers in the area
4) to complete the construction of 40 industrial plants presently
underway in the area, as well as facilitating in the near future,
the construction of roads, piped water, and a sewage system.
The government also took measures to elevate the status of the Kwangju
resettlement area from that of a town, to a city (named Seongnam). At the
same time, jurisdictional and administrative functions were turned over
to Kyeoggi province, the political division in which Kwangju was located.
In short, the Seoul city government did its best to eradicate the problem
by changing the new town's name and leaving administrative responsibilities
to the province of Kyeonggi.
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Ultimately, the government decided to stop transporting squatters
to the new town because, in their words, "it would only serve to stimulate
the outbreak of similar incidents." Consequently, more concern is now
being expressed for the stabilization of squatters already existing in
Seoul, rather than for their removal.
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6. Conclusion
We have so far discussed three programs aimed at controlling urban
squatter dwellings in Seoul. The objective of this chapter is to review
these three programs in reference to the conceptual framework developed in
earlier chapters and to suggest these alternative approaches.
In reviewing the three cases, we will begin by observing the squatter
dwelling situation after the programs of public intervention; that is, to
identify what the results of the program were. In order to do so, we use
the comparative or before-and-after method of analysis; i.e., an extra-
polative approach which compares the results of the extrapolation of the
past trends to the actual situation which existed after the programs. This
is followed by a description of the major reasons for the differences betwe-
en the two results. Finally, we suggest alternative approaches to solving
the problems of squatter dwellings, within a given social and economic-poli-
tical situation.
As was mentioned earlier, when the Seoul city government prepared a
package program of squatter dwellings' removal, the target of its goal was
136,650 units, according to the "Investigation of Illegal Housing" conducted
by the city government in 1966. In comparison, the "Reinvestigation of Ille-
gal Housing" conducted by the city government in 1970, places the number of
squatter dwellings at 187,554 units. Comparing the 1970 figure to the
number of squatter dwellings existing in 1966, we find an increase of as
much as 50,904 units. However, if we consider the fact that another 38,086
units of squatter dwellings were to have been removed, the number of newly
'built dwellings was actually even greater. In'other words, it follows that
88,990 units of squatter dwellings were built afresh during the period of
the squatter dwelling package program's implementation. The result showed
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that the rate of increase in squatter dwel-ling construction for the period
from 1962 to 1970 was faster than that of the period preceding it (1962-66).
As was pointed out in Chapter 3, during the period 1962-66 the average annual
increase of squatter dwellings was 9,648 units, or an average annual increase
rate of 10.9%. On the other hand, the average annual increase of squatter
dwllings, from 1967 to 1970, was 22,248 units. Comparing it to that of the
period from 1962 to 1966 the increase was almost 2.3 times; from an average
annual increase rate of 10.9% to one of 16.3%. Even if we consider the re-
moval of 38,086 units of squatter dwellings, the average annual increase
from 1967 to 1970 was 12,726 units -- still greater than the 9,648 units of
the 1962 to 1966 period.
Without public intervention, what would have happened and how does it
compare to the actual, planned result? We may guess the 1970 result from
the past trend of squatter dwelling increase, by extrapolating the rate of
increase, from 1962 to 1966. Doing so gives us a 1970 figure of 175,244
units. In comparison, the actual number of squatter dwellings was 187,554
units, for a difference of 12,310 units. Consequently, it may be said that,
with the public intervention, the number of squatter dwellings increased as
much as 12,310 units. Furthermore, the programs had led to a situation of
social and political instability, as is evidenced by occurrences such as a
mass social demonstration and riot, and the disastrous accidental collapse of
the Whawoo Citizen's Apartment, which killed 33 persons. In this case,
therefore, the planning had a negative effectiveness in solving an urban
problem, rather than a positive problem-solving outcome.
Through observation of these three programs, we can identify the 'major
reason of this negative effectiveness of planning as being the absence of an
interactive self-teaching relationship between the planning system, and the
planned system. In other words, each system proceeded in its own way, to
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maximize its own expected payoff within the choice-situation which was, at
the same time perceived as being created and/or controlled by the planning
system. Although the planning system did adapt to the external environment,
it was not an adaptation in the relationship to the planned system, but
rather, a self-correcting adaptation to "hit a target". In other words, the
self-correcting adaptation of the planning system functioned to strengthen
the internal intensity of the planning system itself, without responding
to the planned system; that is, to the rationality of the ends-means chain
of the planning system itself, assuming the planned system given.
According to this conceptual framework of planning, the city government
tried to solve the problems of squatter dwellings in Seoul. At that time,
the only end perceived by the city government, for the problem of squatter
dwellings, was to remove them from the visible scenery, using a strong admin-
istrative power. In short, the main concerns of the city government were to
maximize efficiently the "demonstration effect". In such a situation, the
objective of the city government was to achieve the final goal, whatever
means to be used.. For in a target-hit approach, the most important thing
was to fix an exact target: in order to fix the exact target, therefore,
the city government conducted the field survey, "Investigation of Illegal
Housing in Seoul" in 1966 before the city government planned the three pro-
grams. Based on the results of this investigation, the city government fixed
the target of 136,650 units of squatter dwellings to be removed. On the
basis of this aggregate target, the city government again allocated the
aggregate target to create a disaggregate target for each of the three pro-
grams: the legalization of 46,000 units, 14,000 units of citizen's
apartments; and the relocation of 76,650 units into the new town. The
criteria by which the aggregate target was allocated was based on the
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physical conditions and locations of the squatter dwellings. For instance,
the squatter dwellings which were located on the mountain areas and were
visibly ugly, were subject to the program of citizen's apartments. Another
example was the legalization program, in which the squatter dwellings had
to be located on- land not reserved for military or other critical public
purposes. As can.be seen, most of the criteria favored the concerns of city
government, without considering the individual conditions of the squatter
dwellers.
On the other hand, the primary concern of squatter dwellers was mainte-
nance of their level of subsistence, rather than improvement of the physical
condition of their shelters. According to one research report on squatter
dwellings in the city, most squatter residents considered their shelters to
2be permanent, rather than temporary, dwellings. Consequently, from the
squatter dweller's point of view, to remove their shelters meant to remove
the basis of their subsistence.
Meanwhile, the city government utilized very strong control measures
to achieve its goal. In the legalization program, for example, the city
government removed the squatter dwellings by force. However, not only did
this measure not work; it inadvertently brought about the "removal war" be-
tween the city government and the squatter dwellers. In response to this,
the city government took another firm measure, bringing criminal charges
against squatter dwellers who violated the order of the city government.
However, even in this second approach the result was the same -- squatter
dwellers resisted the city government's legal measures. In this case, the
squatter dwellers- responded to the city government with a social demonstra-
tion, invading the office of the Mayor.
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Through all three programs, we can observe three things. The first is
that each system had a different purposefulness. That is to say, the
intent of the city government was to do as good a job as they could of
removing squatter dwellings. Meanwhile, the intention of the squatter
dwellers was to keep their shelters, to survive at their previous level
of subsistance. In fact, the first priority of the squatter dwellers was
to make use of job opportunities, and to improve their income level.
Their motivations being antithetical to those of the city, the squatters
could not adapt to the intention of the planning system, whatever means the
city might use. Therefore, from the very beginning the two systems bore
different purpose-vectors. In a situation in which the external environment
is not shocked, the purpose-vector of each system may stand by potentially.
However, when the situation is changed into a turbulent one by an external
shock, such as public intervention, the purpose-vector of each system may
move to its own direction. In the legalization program, for example, the
planning encouraged potential squatter dwellers to build new squatter dwell-
ings. After announcement of the legalization program, the increase of
squatter dwellings sped up rapidly. In the case of the Kwangju relocation
program, 70% of the original squatter dwellers sold their allotment card
(given by the city government), and moved into the inner-city to resquat,
because they could not survive in Kwangju area. Consequently, in both
cases, the different purpose-vectors of the planners and the squatters could
not match, resulting in a so-called "mismatch of life-space.
The second characteristic shared by the programs is the fact that the
planning system assumed -the planned system to be given. Hence, the basic
notion of the planning system was that, if the plannirg system focused on the
internal intensity of the planning system itself (that is, the rationality
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of the ends-means chain), then the planned system will follow, as the plan-
ning system intended, and the goal would be achieved. However, what the
planning system did not recognize was the fact that the planned system is,
itself, a dynamic object in the social system. In particular, the problem
of squatter dwellings consisted not only of the physical aspect, but also
of human aspects which, in turn, involved a behavior pattern, an income le-
vel, and a life style. In this case, the planning object is not fixed, but
dynamic. Thus human beings cannot help but respond in different ways to
external stimuli. Depending on the situation, the planned system itself
has its own responsive system -- adopting or rejecting the intentions of
the planning system. However, the city government totally neglected to
consider any such response from the planned system. Consequently, the city
government always developed plans based on its own constraints, rather
than on the constraints of the planned system. The major reason of the Wha-
woo Apartment's collapse ties into this kind of behavior pattern on the
part of the planning system. For instance, in a situation in which the
city government wanted to build as many apartments as it could, subject to
its own budgetary limitation, construction contractors could not be paid
sufficient money to build a high quality of apartment. Therefore, most of
the 'professions expected the result.
The third characteristic which we observe is that in all three programs,
there was no learning mechanism in operation. In other words, there was no
institutional communication channel between the planned and the planning
systems. Without this communication channel, it proved very difficult for
the two systems to understand their respective intentions. In the case of
legalization program, the intention of the city government was to improve
not only the existing conditions of each squatter dwelling, but also the
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conditions of the community as a whole. However, the understanding of the
squatter dwellers was that the city government approved of the existing
squatter dwellings, as they had been, with the exception of minor repairs,
such as painting an exterior wall or replacing roofing materials. In fact,
this misunderstanding on the part of the squatter dwellers led them to
build many new squatter dwellings. In the Kwangju new town program, the
direct cause of social rioting was. . k of communication between the city
government and the squatter dwellers. As was previously mentioned, the
government organization of the Kwangju area had a dichotomous character.
That is, the Seoul city government established in the area the Kwangju
Field Office, which dealt mainly with the development affairs of the pro-
ject, such as a land purchase, site development, public works, inducement
of manufacturers, and relocation of squatter-people. On the other hand,
the Kyeonggi Province also established its own field office in the area,
by'which general affairs such as citizen's registration, public health,
education, permission of building and public security, were administered.
As a matter of fact, administrative boundaries placed the Kwangju new town
within the ju-risdiction of Kyeonggi Province. However, it was the Kwangju
Field Office who maintained the real power of managmentover the town.
Therefore, the relationship between the two Field Offices was not very good,
and their actions were not cooperative. In this situation, there was no
definitive authoritative administrat4ive organization to which the squatter
dwellers could offer their views and complaints. Furthermore, each Field
Office had proceeded its own profits to maximize to match the development
cost. When the original squatter dWellers came into the new town, they
received an allotment card with which ithey could acquire a parcel of land
(20 pyeong) with a disposable price of W 500 - 2,000. Since the squatter
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dwellers lacked the ability to pay this amount, they were offered a purchase
plan by which they could pay the downpayment in 5 years, after 3 years of
occupancy. But, most of the original squatter dwellers sold- the allotment
card to the volunteer settlers at the market value. Then, the Kwangju Field
Office reacted to this by cancelling their right on the land, and imposing
a surcharge of 8,000 - 16,000 won on the volunteer settlers. Meanwhile,
the Field Office of the Kyeonggi province also tried to collect property
taxes on the land, breaking the promise of 3 years' tax exemption. The
Field Office sent notification of such to the volunteer settlers, warning
that violators would be jailed for 6 months. In this one-way communication,
the squatter dwellers had no'choice but to resist against the government's
policy.
These results provide additional support for the conclusion that the
planning is not simply an ends-means chain, but more accurately, an inter-
active process, between the planning system and its environment. Therefore,
the planning process is not a once-and-for-all affair, but rather a contin-
uous effort throughout the entire goal-seeking process. As the interactive
relationship between a planning system and a planned system is not momentary,
but maintained over a period of time, each system takes a co-production of
choice-learning-adaptation. And, when the interactive process is recognized,
the concept of control cannot be defined to be merely manipulated by the plan-
ning system, on the object, to achieve an outcome as intended by the plan/
planners.
Accepting this concept of the planning process, we may suggest some
alternative approaches which might have been taken, to solve the problems of
urban squatter dwellings in Seoul during the time period in question'.
The first one is, in theory, to narrow the gap between the intentions of
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the planning system and the planned system. As a matter of fact, the city
government's goal of solving the problem of urban squatter dwellings was a
very broad and general concept. Therefore, there was no "life-space" to
be able to accept the goal of each system while in practice, the scope of
the intentions of each system need to be specified. Here, the source of
failure lay in the city government's treatment of the squatter dwelling
problem as an aggregate object. As a result, the city's approach was to
adopt a comprehensive plan; one which failed to consider the existing con-
dition of the planned system. In such a situation, the proper approach would
be case by case method, depending on the existing condition of each system,
rather than a large scale, comprehensive planning approach of the sort which
was tried, and failed. By doing so, the criteria by which we divide all
squatter dwellings into an object of each program include not only physical
conditions but also socio-economic conditions of the planned system (i.e.,
the squatter community.
The second alternative approach would be to institutionalize a learning
mechanism, so as to formalize the pattern of communication between the plan-
ning system and the planned system. One measure of this sort is to institu-
tionalize a communication channel through direct participation of a workshop
group which includes representatives of squatter dwellers, professions, and
public servants. This institutional communication system may protect in
advance some unfortunate and unforeseen outcomes, such as a social demonstra-
tion and riot.
The third alternative involves indirect ways to improve the existing
conditions of the planned system, so as to improve its ability to adapt to
the intentions of the planning system. A job training program for squatter
dwellers is one example; others might include a community development
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movement, etc. Programs such as these, which function to bring the vectors
of intent of the planned system closer to those of the planners could by
providing them with a commonality of purpose, enhance the potential
for the success of a planning policy. By doing so, it would improve the
efficacy of planning, per se, within the social system which is, simultan-
eously, the object and the constraint of its actions.
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PART FIVE - NOTES
1. City of Seoul, Korea, "Investigation of Illegal Housing in Seoul'l 1966.
2. Seongun Lee, A Study of Urban Squatters, Dissertation of Graduate
School of Environmental Science Seoul National University, 1979, p. 71.
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